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ABSTRACT
The Rationalization of the United States and
Canadian Automotive Industry; 1960-1975
May, 1979
David M. Flynn, B.A.
,
MBA, Ph.D
University of Massachusetts
Directed by Dr. A. Elliott Carlile
The question addressed in this study is whether the objectives of the
United States-Canadian Automotive Agreement of 1965 have been met through
1975. The objectives are stated as follows:
(A) The creation of a broader market for automotive products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large scale production can
be achieved;
(B) The liberalization of the United States and Canadian automotive
trade in respect to trade barriers and other factors tending to impede
it, with a view to enabling the industries of both countries to
participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total market
of the two countries;
(C) The development of conditions in which forces may
operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment,
production and trade.
Focus
In the pursuit of this question of the effectiveness
in attaining the
originally stated objectives, I have also pointed out some
shortcomings of
the United States-Canadian Automotive Agreement.
These may have impeded t
continued achievement of the Agreement objectives.
Insights from government
and automotive personnel provide insights
beyond the raw economic data.
IX
The relationship between classical and neo-classical trade theory and
the U.S. -Canadian automotive market provides new insights into why nations
trade within the same industry. Comparative advantage is not the only
directive.
Economic efficiency is the theme of the Agreement. This study provides
other criteria for policy development in international markets.
Findings
The generalized finds of the study are summarized as follows;
(1)
Integration of the U.S. -Canadian automobile market has improved
from the 1960-1966 levels as measured by the changes in dollar and unit
automobile imports.
(2)
The efficiency of the Canadian automotive market has not sig-
nificantly improved due to the Agreement.
(3) The Canadian consumer-taxpayer ’ s relative position
has not
improved after the Agreement as measured by lower relative prices of
comparable automobiles produced in Canada and the U.S. These results
were compared to the tariff revenues lost from free trade. Also
Canadian consumption of U.S. -Canadian type automobiles has not
significantly increased as a result of the Agreement.
(4) Canada’s gain in automotive employment and
earnings does not
reflect Pareto optimal results and thus a loss to U.S.
automotive
workers
.
(5)
Intraindustry trade increased after the Agreement,
inconsistent
with the Hecsher-Ohlin factor proportions theory of
international
trade
.
Conclusion
Canada has benefited from the freer trade
agreement, however in-
vestment policies of the U.S. automobile companies
have been biased toward
Xthe U.S. There is a need for new investment into capital and skill intensive
sectors of the Canadian automotive industry. This can be achieved through
further cooperation between the auto companies and the Canadian government
with the precondition of national planning in the Canadian economy.
Free trade agreements between the United States and Canada are
recommended for other industries with the intention of further integrating
the U.S. and Canadian markets. As economic integration is being achieved,
the intention of moving beyond bilaterialism toward multilateralism should
be prioritized in fulfillment of the objectives of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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1CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
Introduction
The question as to whether policy formulation is a science has been
frequently addressed by academics and practitioners. A science can be viewed
as a set of paradigms which are generally accepted at any particular time and
by their nature tend to be relatively inflexible. And as further elaborated by
Thomas Kuhn:^
No part of the aim of moral science is to call forth new sorts of
phenomena; indeed those who will not fit the box are often not seen
at all . . . normal scientific research is directed to the
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm
already supplies.
This inflexible view of science is quite contrary to the nature
of
2
policy and strategy formulation as James Brian Quinn states.
the process [of strategy formulation] is rarely completely
orderly, rational or consistent. Instead the executive
responds
opportunistically to new threats, crises, and proposals ...
Establishing strategic goals for complex organizations
is a
delicate art [and not a science], requiring a subtle
balance of
vision, entrepreneurship and politics. At the center
of the art
one finds consciously managed processes of broad
8oal setting
and "logical incrementalism." ... they tend to
develop such goals
through very complicated, largely political,
consensus building
pro^efses that are outside the structure of most
formal management
systems and frequently have no precise beginning
or end.
Therefore, policy formulation will not be treated
as a science here because
it "does not meet the scientific
requirement that the phenomena under
3
investigation be fixed, consistent and natural.
2In this research, I evaluate the economic policy choice of ration-
alization of automotive production through the most economic use of the
resources of land, labor, capital and management in the Canadian and United
States automobile industry. Strategy formulation of the firms operating
within this market is constrained by the provisions of the Automotive
Agreement of 1965 between the governments of Canada and the United States.
The effectiveness of their strategies is evaluated through the benefits and
losses that accrue to the people of Canada and the United States.
Focus
every man who lives by supplying any want, dreads anything
which tends either to dry up that want or to supply it more easily
and abundantly. It is to his interest that scarcity should reign
in the very thing which it is his function to make abundant, and
that abundance should reign everywhere else ... The desire
for
relative scarcity in his own skill, or his own commodity is
therefore only too natural and intelligible in any man. It is
the
desire for the conditions that will secure to him what
everyone
desires. Only these conditions must, by their nature,
tend to
exclude others from the privileges they secure to him.
It is under this guise that so often a tariff or some
other trade harriers are
erected to stifle competition from foreign imports.
On October 4, 1904, Ford Motor Company of
Canada started to assemble
automobiles in what had previously been the
Walkerville Wagon Company.
Gordon M. McGregor, President of this company
raised the necessary $125,000
to start the Ford Motor Company of
Canada, backed by the vision and
imagination of Henry Ford. The Ford Motor
Company was the first company to
manufacture automobiles in Canada.
Honourable W. S. Fielding, Minister of
Finance, described in the House of Commons,
the experience of Ford's entry
into Windsor:
3I think, Sir, as to whether or not it is adequate protection [35%
tariff to protect the thriving Canadian carriage industry]
,
we
have some evidence of a gratifying character that the tariff,
without being evasive, is high enough to bring some American
industries into Canada looks very much like a tariff which affords
adequate protection.
It was behind this tariff wall, which changed in 1936 to 17-1/2 per
cent, that the Canadian automobile industry developed. Its development was
thwarted by its limited production runs of any particular model of
automobile. This is attributed to the Canadian automobile industry's
supplying the limited but varied "wants" of the Canadian and Commonwealth
market.
In free trade theory, it is held that through parallel increase in
specialization and coordination both at the domestic and international
levels, that serves as a major aspect of the process of economic growth
itself. An obvious corollary is that a conscious effort to slow down the
trend toward greater interdependence would have a negative effect on the
rate
, 6
of economic growth.
In 1963, the Canadian government in attempts "to move towards
com-
plementary economic specialization in automobile production
almost without
regard to the Canadian-United States border"^ revealed the
Drury Plan. The
plan, in essence, remitted the duty on all motor
vehicle imports dollar for
dollar for the equivalent increase in Canadian
content for export. The
remission plan had many critics, especially independent
parts manufacturers
of the United States, who were being underpriced.
In Adam Smith's words, the
remission was a "bounty" and it could be considered
so in the United States
courts
.
4The Modine Manufacturing Co., of Racine, Wisconsin, petitioned the U.S.
Treasury Department's Commissioner of Customs to determine whether a bounty
or grant, direct or indirect had been given under the Canadian export
incentive program. If prima facie evidence was found, countervailing duties
of up to 25% would be levied on imported Canadian automotive products.
Before the case was concluded, the United States-Canadian Automotive
Agreement was signed on January 16, 1965.
It is this agreement that has brought the United States and Canada
together in the joint United States-Canadian automotive market in attempts to
rationalize automobile production in this larger market.
In this study, I seek to determine if the objectives of the Agreement
were met, which are as follows:
(A) The creation of a broader market for automobile products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large scale
production can be achieved.
(B) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive
trade,
in respect to tariff barriers and other factors tending
to impede
it with a view to enabling the industries of both
countries to
participate on a more fair and equitable basis in the
expanding
total market of two countries.
(C) The development of conditions in which
market forces may operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern
of investment,
production and trade.
In the pursuit of these answers, I also
point out some shortcomings of
the United States-Canadian Automotive
Agreement that may impede the most
5economically efficient rationalization of automotive production. Insights
from government and automotive company personnel will be used in this
evaluation. The history of the Canadian automotive industry will be
discussed so as to develop a strong foundation for past, present and future
developments of the United States-Canadian Automotive Market.
The theory of economic integration is addressed in relation to the
future further development of free trade between Canada and the United
States. I also develop the product-cycle view of the evolution of trade
patterns as is put forth by Raymond Vernon^ in its relation to the automobile
industry. The analysis in most cases is limited to the automobile statistics
and not of trucks, buses, snowmobiles and other special carriers.
Problem
The benefits to be expected from trade liberalization may be
classified
into consumption and production gains and those resulting from
economies of
scale. Consumption gains appear in the form of lower prices
to the consumer.
Production gains accrue as inefficiently produced domestic
output is
replaced by imports. This permits the reallocation of
some domestic land,
labour, and capital away from low productivity
industries into more
productive employment of those industries in which
the country
comparative advantage. Economies of scale gains
occur through larger more
10
efficient plants resulting in larger production
gams.
Canada has benefited from economies of scale
arising from not only
larger more efficient plants but also from
the increased length of production
6runs. In the first case, the larger plants result in lower costs per unit of
output because of labor specialization. In the latter case, the fewer the
number of differentiated products manufactured in each plant, the lower are
per unit costs, because of savings in inventories of intermediate inputs and
outputs, downtime of machines, and stoppages in work as dies and other tools
are changed. Also, machines can be constructed specifically for long high-
speed runs and labor has to learn fewer tasks.
This study will explore the degree to which integration of Canadian and
United States automobile production operations have occurred since the
signing of this freer trade agreement. The efficiency of Canadian operations
was a major impetus for the signing of the Agreement. This issue will be
analyzed through a comparison of the increased production in relation to the
increased employment. Scale economies suggest the significance of
this
hypothesis as economic integration occurs through this bilateral free
trade
agreement.
As the Canadian automobile industry moves toward greater
efficiency to a
more equitable level with its U.S. counterpart, benefits
will accrue to the
Canadian consumer-taxpayer and the automobile wage earner.
The benefits to
the consumer become obvious through lower
relative automobile prices
outweighing the tariff revenues lost as automotive
products are granted free
entry into the Canadian market as a result of
the Agreement. The wage earner
benefits through increased wages as a result
of the economic integra
two markets sharing a common boundary.
The theory of economic integration
suggests equalization of costs of the
factors of production as the
comparative advantage of each country changes
to the comparative advantage of
the now larger more efficient North
American automobile market.
7It is important to note that the effects in the short run are less
significant as the Agreement dictated greater production in the more costly
Canadian automotive industry. A situation of trade diversion was more
significant in the short run than in the long run when the efficiency gains
occurred as economies of scale were achieved.
Methodology
One important aspect of the statistical evaluation of the hypotheses is
in determining the status of the automobile industry had the Agreement not
occurred. The assumptions will be made explicit which are necessary to
address this issue of "in the absence of" the Agreement. Interview data is
used from personal interviews with Canadian and United States automotive
personnel and government officials to provide expert insight and enhance
the
timeliness of the research. The greatest portion of the economic
data is
from secondary sources of the U.S. and Canadian government,
automobile
companies, and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association.
A British economist's view that automobiles will turn
out to be the
textiles of tomorrow is addressed through a theoretical
presentation of the
product cycle view of trade evolution. This
analysis along with a
discussion of free trade theory and economic integration
appears in Chapter
III. The hypotheses previously mentioned are
tested in the fourth chapter.
Summary of the results and conclusions appear
in Chapter V. The concluding
sixth chapter suggests the need of other
than economic criteria in decision
making for the U.S. /Canadian automotive industry.
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9CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
FROM 1854 TO 1975
Brief History Of Trade Reciprocity
In 1854, the United States drew up the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada
which was the first in its trade history. This Treaty was signed in 1855 and
under this agreement free trade was established for natural products.
Arrangements were also made for the joint sharing of the Atlantic Coast
fisheries, both countries' canal systems, and in addition, it provided for
the use by American ships of the St. Lawrence River and by Canadian ships
of
Lake Michigan. Although the reciprocity treaty proved to be of
greater
advantage to Canada, largely due to the lower factor costs in
Canada, the
total trade between the two countries over eleven years
increased about
threefold.^ The treaty was subsequently repealed in 1866
due to the increase
in Canadian protectionist policies and the need for
the increased revenues in
both countries achieved through tariffs.
Despite his passage of the Tariff Act in 1909
which slighted recipro-
city, President Taft again drafted legislation
for reciprocity with Canada
and a preliminary agreement was signed on
January 21, 1911. This agreement
provided for free trade of certain food items,
decreased rates on others, and
equalized rates on automobiles
by Congress on July 22, 1911.
and agricultural machinery and it was
passed
However, except for the free
importation of
10
print and wood pulp, the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada never went into
effect. The liberal administration of Sir Wilfred Laurier was defeated in
Canada and with this defeat the advocates of free trade with the United
States lost their influence. James Eayrs
,
in his observation on reciprocity,
stated:^
Both Canada and the United States have adhered to the ideology of
freer trade, with the world outside and each other. Both have allowed
their doctrinal commitment to be mamed by the protectionist practices.
Protection by one country becomes a problem for the other. The
magnitude of the problem is greater for Canada, the welfare of Canadians
being more dependent upon access to the American market than the welfare
of Americans upon access to the Canadian market. But it is no small
problem for the United States either.
The issue of reciprocity with Canada didn’t come out again until the
passage of the Canada-United States Agreements of 1935 and 1938. These
Agreements were the first large-scale commercial agreements between the
United States and Canada to be carried to a successful conclusion since
the
aborted Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The United States was granted
most-
favored-nation status and in some products tariff reductions
were below
Canada's intermediate rates. This narrowed Great Britain’s
most-favored-
nation status. However, they did not constitute a significant
departure from
traditional commercial policy but rather signified a
return to the status quo
3
that existed before the disruptions of the early
1930’ s.
While there have not been any reciprocal agreements
of the traditional
kind between Canada and the United States since 1938,
important reciprocal
reductions in tariff have occurred under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) which was signed in Geneva,
Switzerland, on October 30,
11
The basic purpose of this agreement which originally covered 33 members and
now covers 70 countries (representing four-fifths of world trade) is stated
as follows:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, insuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the World and expanding
the production and exchange of goods;
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by en-
tering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade and to the elimination of discriminating treatment
in international commerce;
Perhaps the most important part of the agreement was the Most Favored Nation
Treatment clause appearing in Part 1, Article 1 of GATT. Under this clause
each member gets the benefit of every tariff reduction made by the other. It
also forbids discrimination and prohibits quotas, protective internal taxes,
restrictive customs and administrative devices and other non-trade barriers.
Exceptions are made for countries in balance of payments difficulties
and for
those imposing similar quantitative controls upon their
domestic output,
e.g. agriculture.
From the numerous individual tariff negotiations carried
on under GATT,
concessions covering over sixty thousand items have
been agreed upon. These
comprise more than two-thirds of the total import
trade of participating
countries and more than half of the total number
of commodities involved in
world trade.
^
12
Antecedent Conditions of the "Agreement"
United States and Canadian Automotive Production and Consumption Before
1965. Throughout the post World War II period and prior to the signing of the
United States-Canadian automotive agreement, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler
and American Motors (the Big Four) were the major motor vehicle producers in
both the United States and Canada. In 1964, in terms of quantity, they
accounted for 99.9 per cent of the passenger cars (see Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Passenger automobiles have comprised the bulk of motor vehicle produc-
tion in the United States and Canada since World War II. By 1960 United-
States production of passenger automobiles numbered 6.6 million units in-
creasing to 7.7 million units in 1964 (see Tables 3 and 4). Canadian pro-
duction of passenger automobiles totalled 325,000 units in 1960 and 559,000
units in 1964 (see Tables 5 and 6). In terms of the numbers produced,
Canadian production of automobiles constitutes 4.6 per cent of the
total
United States-Canadian production in 1960 and 6.7 per cent in 1964
(see Table
7). In 1964, Canadian production of motor vehicles was
the highest that it
had ever been in Canadian automotive history. Due to
this predominance of
passenger automobile production in overall motor vehicle
production, this
study will cover the passenger automobile industry
and will exclude trucks,
buses and special purpose vehicles. Also, although
original equipment parts
makes up 65-75 per cent of the cost of
completed vehicles in the United
States and 44 per cent of total production,
and in Canada, 81.6 per cent of
total production was by independent vehicle
parts manufacturers (see Tables 4
13
and 8). Independent parts venders are highly dependent on orders from the
large motor vehicle manufacturers.^ Thus, specific discussion of the
original equipment parts industry will be excluded from this report.^
14
TABLE 1
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles;
Share of United States production, by manufacturer,
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in per cent)
Year
General
Motors Ford Chrysler AMC
Big
Four
All
other Total
1960 47.7 28.2 15.2 7.2 98.3 1.7 100.0
1961 49.5 30.6 11.7 6.7 98.5 1.5 100.0
1962 53.9 27.9 10.3 6.5 98.6 1.4 100.0
1963 53.5 25.5 13.7 6.3 99.0 1.0 100.0
1964 51.1 27.7 16.0 5.1 99.9 0.1 100.0
1965 53.0 27.5 15.7 3.7 99.9 0.1 100.0
1966 51.7 28.2 16.8 3.2 99.9 0.1 100.0
1967 55.5 22.9 18.4 3.1 99.9 0.1 100.0
1968 51.9 27.1 17.9 3.0 99.9 0.1 100.0
1969 53.7 26.3 16.9 3.0 99.9 0.1 100.0
1970 45.5 30.8 19.4 4.2 99.9 0.1 100.0
1971 56.7 25.4 15.0 2.8 99.9 0.1 100.0
1972 54.0 27.2 15.5 3.2 99.9 0.1 100.0
1973 54.3 25.8 16.1 3.7 99.9 0.1 100.0
1974: January- ^
June 46.8 30.2 17.6 5.3 99.9 0.1 iUU.U
1975: January- ,
June 54.7 27.8 12.3 5.1 99.9 U.i iUU.U
SOURCE: Canadian Automobile Agreement; United States International
Trade Commission Report on the United States-Canadian Automobile
Agreement.
Its History, Tariffs and Impact and the Ninth Annual Report of
the Presi-
dent to the Congress on the Operation of the Automotive Products
Trade Ac
of 1965; Committee on Finance. United States Senate,
Russel B. Long, Chair
man January
,
1976. United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1976. 62-4780. P. 237
^The term "United States-Canadian-type" motor
scribe motor vehicles produced in the United States
and/or Canada by firms
headoLrtered in the United States or Canada. It does
not include United
StatL-or Canadian- made vehicles produced by such firms
as Volvo or
Renault which are headquartered in third countries.
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TABLE 2
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles;
Share of Canadian Production, by manufacturer,
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in per cent)
General Big All
Year Motors Ford Chrysler AMC Four other Total
1960 53.9
1961 51.2
1962 53.6
1963 49.7
1964 44.2
1965 49.8
1966 41.2
1967 44.0
1968 38.2
1969 38.4
1970 24.6
1971 37.8
1972 31.1
1973 33.4
1974 40.8
1974: January-
June 41.7
1975; January-
June 41.8
28.9 15.5 —
30.0 14.3 2.6
27.6 11.8 5.1
26.8 16.3 5.7
27.5 18.8 6.3
24.0 19.2 4.4
28.7 25.0 4.8
25.0 26.3 4.7
32.4 24.7 4.7
38.4 19.7 3.5
43.7 26.4 5.3
36.5 21.7 4.0
40.3 23.4 5.2
38.0 22.3 6.3
34.9 19.3 5.0
32.7 19.7 5.9
28.8 25.1 4.3
98.3 1.7 100.0
98.1 1.9 100.0
98.5 1.9 100.0
96.8 1.5 100.0
97.4 3.2 100.0
99.7 2.6 100.0
100.0 0.1 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
100.0 — 100.0
SOURCE: Canadian Automobile Agreement, op. cit. , p. 241
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TABLE 3
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
United States Production, by manufacturer, 1960-74,
January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in thousands of units)
Year
General
Motors Ford Chrysler AMC
Big
Four
All
other Total
1960 3,193 1,892 1,019 486 6,590
5,438
113 6,703
1961 2,727 1,690 649 372 84 5,521
1962 3,741 1,935 717 455 6,848 95 6,943
1963 4,078 1,941 1,048 480 7,547 75 7,621
1964 3,956 2,146 1,242 394 7,738 7 7,745
1965 4,949 2,566 1,468 346 9,329 6 9,335
1966 4,449 2,425 1,446 279 8,599
7,407
6 8,605
1967 4,117 1,696 1,364 230 6 7,413
1968 4,593 2,397 1,586 268 8,844 5 8,849
1969 4,421 2,163 1,392 243 8,219 5 8,224
1970 2,980 2,017 1,273 276 6,546 4 6,550
1971 4,853 2,196 1,288 236 8,553 5 8,558
1972 4,776 2,401 1,366 279 8,822 6 8,828
1973 5,253 2,496 1,556 356 9,661 6 9,667
1974 3,571 2,205 1,177 351 7,304 5 7,309
1974: January-
_
June 1,788 1,153 672 201 3,814 3 3,01/
1975: January- „
June 1,715 870 386 160 3,131 z 3,i:>J
SOURCE: Compiled from automotive production data published in
Auto-
motive News, Ward’s Automotive Reports, and material supplied to
the United
States International Trade Commission by the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers
Association (United States) and by individual manufacturers.
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TABLE 4
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
United States-Canadian-type trucks and buses, total
United States-Canadian-type on-the-highway motor
vehicles, and original-equipment motor-vehicle parts:
United States production in terms of transfer values,
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in millions of United States dollars)
On-the-Highway motor vehicles Original equip
ment motor-
Passenger Trucks and vehicle
Period automobiles buses Total parts
1960 10,198
1961 11,278
14,3261962
1963 16,394
1964 15,809
1965 21,486
1966 21,390
1967 18,102
1968 22,739
1969 22,375
17,2381970
1971 24,585
1972 26,734
1973 30,511
1974 24,711
1974: January-
June 11,728
1975: January-
June 12,343
2,700 12,898 9,092
2,262 13,540 10,166
2,688 17,014 12,654
3,109 19,503 14,562
3,315 19,124 15,094
3,802 25,288 19,467
4,057 24,447 18,892
3,798 21,900 16,808
4,695 27,434 19,464
5,307 27,682 20,764
4,872 22,110 17,058
6,364 30,949 22,458
8,112 34,846 24,253
10,556 41,067 29,235
11,003 35,714 29,138
5,832 17,560 13,548
4,959 17,302 15,170
SOURCE: Partly estimated on the basis of firm's
responses to the
questionnaires of the United States International Trade
Commission.
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TABLE 5
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
Canadian production, by manufacturer, 1960-74,
January-June 1974, and January-June 1975,
(in thousands of units)
Year
General
Motors Ford Chrysler AMC
Big
Four
All
other Total
1960 175 94 50 - — . 319 6 325
1961 167 98 45 9 321 6 327
1962 229 118 51 22 420 8 428
1963 265 142 87 30 524 8 532
1964 246 153 105 35 539 18 557
1965 351 169 136 31 687 19 706
1966 286 198 173 33 690 2 692
1967 312 178 187 33 710
-- 710
1968 338 287 219 42 886
-- 886
1969 392 391 201 36 1,020
906
-- 1,020
9061970 223 396 239 49
--
1971 406 392 233 54 1,074
-- 1,074
1972 354 459 266 59 1,138
-- 1
,
138
1973 392 445 261 74 1,172
-- 1,172
1974 478 409 226 58 1,171 1,171
1974: January- ,,,
June 278 218 131 39 bbb
" DOD
1975: January-
,
June 223 154 134 23 534
SOURCE: Compiled from automotive production data published
in
Automotive News, Ward's Automotive Reports, and
the United States International Trade Commission by the
Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association (United States and Canada) and by
individual
manufacuturers
.
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TABLE 6
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles;
United States-Canadian-type trucks and buses, total
United States-Canadian-type on-the-highway motor
vehicles, and original-equipment motor-vehicle parts:
Canadian production in terms of transfer values,
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in millions of United States dollars)
On-the-Highway motor vehicles Original equip
ment motor-
Passenger Trucks and vehicle
Period automobiles buses Total parts
1960 532
1961 522
1962 732
1963 977
1964 995
1965 1,378
1966 1,365
1967 1,448
1968 1,902
1969 2,299
1970 1,993
1971 2,552
1972 2,720
1973 3,155
1974 3,713
1974: January-
June 1,777
1975: January-
June 1,795
153 685 234
135 668 224
183 915 305
219 1,196 406
262 1,257 402
309 1,687 462
382 1,747 641
430 1,878 856
541 2,443 971
644 2,943 1,341
550 2,543 1,453
629 3,181 1,338
786 3,506 1,716
975 4,130 2,066
1,177 4,890 2,276
598 2,375 1,052
703 2,498 1,076
SOURCE: Partly estimated on the basis of firm's responses
to the
questionnaires of the United States International Trade
Commission.
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TABLE 7
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
Canadian production as a share of total
United States-Canadian production, by manufacturer,
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in per cent)
Year
General
Motors Ford Chrysler AMC
Big
Four
All
other Total
1960 5.2 4.7 4.7 • » — 4.6 5.0 4.6
1961 5.8 5.5 6.9 2.4 5.6 6.7 5.6
1962 5.8 5.7 6.6 4.6 5.8 7.8 5.8
1963 6.1 6.8 7.7 5.9 6.5 19.4 6.5
1964 5.9 6.7 7.8 8.2 6.5 73.1 6.7
1965 6.6 6.2 8.5 8.2 6.9 25.0 7.0
1966 6.0 7.5 10.7 10.6 7.4 — 7.4
1967 7.0 9.5 12.1 12.5 8.7
— 8.7
1968 6.9 10.7 12.1 13.5 9.1
— 9.1
1969 8.1 15.3 12.6 12.9 11.0 11.0
1970 7.0 16.4 15.8 14.8 12.2
— 12.2
1971 7.7 15.3 15.3 15.4 11.2
— 11.2
1972 6.9 16.0 16.3 17.5 11.4
— 11.4
1973 6.9 15.1 14.4 17.2 10.8
— 10.8
1974 11.8 15.6 16.1 14.2 13.8 13.8
1974: January- ,, „
June 13.5 15.9 16.3 16.3 14.9
“ “ “ “ 14.
y
1975: January-
. ,
,, ,
June 11.5 15.0 25.8 12.6 14.
b
14.0
SOURCE: Canadian Automobile Agreement, op.cit., p. 247
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TABLE 8
Original-equipment motor-vehicle parts:
United States production, by class of producer
in terms of transfer values, 1960-74
January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
Period
Motor
vehicle
Manufacturers
Independent
parts
producers Total
Independents
as a per cent
of the total
Million U.S. Million U.S. Million U.S.
dollars dollars dollars Per Cent
1960 4,718 4,374 9,092 48.1
1961 5,678 4,448 10,166 44.1
1962 7,065 5,589 12,654 43 .
6
1963 8,209 6,353 14,562 43.9
1964 8,465 6,629 15,094 44.3
1965 10,839 8,628 19,467 44.3
1966 10,645 8,247 18,892 43.7
1967 9,461 7,347 16,808 43.7
1968 11,222 8,242 19,464 42.3
1969 11,973 8,791 20,764 42.3
1970 9,472 7,586 17,058 44.5
1971 13.037 9,421 22,458 41.9
1972 13,799 10,454 24,253 43.1
1973 16,002 13,233 29,235 45 .
3
1974 16,176 12,962 29,138 44.5
1974: January-
13,548June 7,492 6,056 44.7
1975: January-
June 7,807 7,363 15,170
48.5
SOURCE: Partly estimated on the basis of firm's responses
to the
questionnaires of the United States International Trade Commission.
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Consumption of new passenger automobiles in the United States and Canada
grew very quickly following World War 11, from 1.9 million vehicles in 1946
to 6.7 million vehicles in 1950. From 1950 to 1960 sales of passenger
automobiles in the United States and Canada exceeded the 1950 level only in
1955 when United States-Canadian sales amounted to 7.6 million vehicles. In
1960, consumption amounted to 7 million units, but in 1963 it amounted to 8.1
million units and in 1964 it amounted to 8.7 million units (see Table 9).
Non-United States-Canadian produced passenger automobiles accounted for
a substantially larger share of Canadian consumption throughout the post-
World War II period than was the case in the United States. These third-
country inputs accounted for less than 1% of United States consumption in
1950 as compared with 20% in the same year in Canada. During the late 1950 's
third countries rapidly increased their share of the United States and
Canadian markets, to 10.3 per cent of the United States market and 25.8 per
cent of the Canadian market in 1959. The growing popularity of United
States-Canadian-type small passenger automobiles which had been introduced
in the late 1950 's reduced the third-country share of the United
States
market to 6 per cent by 1964 and their share of the Canadian
market to 11.2
per cent in the same year. However, for the first half of 1975,
third country
imports represented 20.3% of the total United States consumption
and 15.0% of
the total Canadian consumption (see Tables 10 and 11)
.
Canada Consumed 4% of the United States-Canadian-type
passenger auto-
mobiles in 1950, 5% in 1960 and 6.6% in 1964. Canadian
production of these
vehicles was 2.5% in 1950, 2.8% in 1960 and 4.0% in
1964. These production
figures assume a 60% Canadian content in Canadian
vehicles produced (base
23
level Canadian sourced parts and labor set by the Canadian government)
. In
contrast with Canada's share of United States-Canadian production, a "gap"
existed between it and Canada's share of United States-Canadian production of
1.5% in 1950, 2.2% in 1960 and 2.6% in 1964. Canada has argued that in an
integrated motor vehicle industry such gaps should not exist and that some
means should be available to aid in closing them and thereby achieving a fair
share of the United States-Canadian market^ (see Tables 7 and 12)
.
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TABLE 9
New Passenger automobiles: United States consumption,
Canadian consumption, and total United States-
Canadian consumption, 1960-74, January-June 1974,
and January-June 1975
Canada as
Year
United
States Canada Total
a per cent
of the tot<
1 ,000 units 1,000 units 1,000 units Per Cent
1960 6,577 448 7,025 6.4
1961 5,855 437 6,292 6.9
1962 6,930 502 7,441 6.7
1963 7,557
8,068
542 8,099 6.7
1964 607 8,675 7.0
1965 9,315 685 10,000
9,693
6.8
1966 9,009 684 7.1
1967 8,357 667 9,024 7.4
1968 9,404 738 10,142 7.3
1969 9,447 756 10,203 7.4
1970 8,385 636 9,021
10,474
7.1
1971 9,729 745 7.1
1972 10,487 813 11,200
12,286
7.3
1973 11,351 935 7.6
1974 8,701 872 9,573 9.1
1974: January- , ,
June 4,649 389 5,038 / . /
1975: January- , ^
June 4,101 340 4,441 / . /
SOURCE: Compiled from automotive registration and retail sales
data
published in Automotive News, Ward's Automotive Reports, Canadian
Auto-
motive Trade, and material supplied to the United States I^t^^f^ionl
Trade
Commission by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (United
States
and Canada), and by individual manufacturers.
25
TABLE 10
New Passenger automobiles: United States consumption,
of United States-Canadian-type vehicles, United States
consumption of Non-United States-Canadian-type vehicles;
United States-Canadian-type vehicle consumption to the
total, 1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
Year
U.S.-
Canadian
type
Non-U. S.-
Canadian
type Total
Non-U. S.-
Canadian-type
as a per cent
of the total
1,000 units 1,000 units 1,000 units Per Cent
1960 6,076 501 6,577 7.6
1961 5,475 380 5,855 6,5
1962 6,600 339 6,939 4.9
1963 7,171 386 7,557 5.1
1964 7,584 484 8,068 6.0
1965 8,746 569 9,315 6.1
1966 8,351 658 9,009 7.3
1967 7,578 779 8,357 9.3
1968 8,418 986 9,404 10.5
1969 8,385 1,062 9,447 11.2
1970 7,154 1,231 8,385 14.7
1971 8,263 1,466 9,729
10,487
15.1
1972 8,958 1,529 14.6
1973 9,631 1,720 11,351 15.2
1974 7,332 1,369 8,701 15.7
1974: January-
June 3,946 703 4,649 15.1
1975: January-
June 3,268 833 4,101 20.3
SOURCE: Compiled from data published by Automotive News, Ward's Auto
motive Reports, and material supplied to the United States Internationl
Trade Commission by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (United
States)
.
(biles:
Canadian
consumption
of
United
States-Canadian-type
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United States and Canadian trade in automotive products before 1965 .
Canada’s automotive industry developed largely through the American Motors
Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, the Ford Motor Company, General Motors
Corporation and Studebaker-Packard Corporation. As previously mentioned in
the first chapter, the Ford Motor Company was the forerunner in the de-
velopment of the Canadian auto industry and exclusive rights to manufacture
Ford cars in Canada were granted by Henry Ford in 1904 to a group of Canadian
businessmen. From that time until the agreement, much of the development of
Canada's automotive industry is attributed to the high tariff wall of 17.5%
and the access by Canadian automotive producers to the markets of the British
Commonwealth. \ The Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects reporting
on the Canadian automotive industry, makes the following observation:
The customs tariff, including Empire Content requirements and
tariff preference in Empire Markets, has been of major sig-
nificance in the development of the Canadian automotive parts
industry. Prior to 1926, the rates of duty on automobiles and
automobile parts were such that a large measure of protection was
provided to the Canadian industry, particularly in view of the
preference granted in Empire markets with a 50 percent Empire
content. The provision for a 99 percent drawback of duty paid on
imported parts and materials incorporated in vehicles exported. .
.
The effect of the content revision of 1936 has undoubtly
spurred the manufacture of additional automotive parts in Canada.
With pressure to achieve the higher content of 60 percent
purchasing departments of the major manufacturing companies were
forced to canvass Canadian sources of 'gupply more carefully and,
where possible, award business locally.
^ In support of the aforementioned position of the
large American pro
ducers manufacturing and selling for Canada and the British
Commonwealth,
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Canada’s exports to the United States for completed passenger vehicles was
less than 1,000 for 1951-1959, 1,000-2,000 from 1960-1963 and 12,000 in 1964
(see Table 13). The jump in exports was said to be largely attributed to
Studebakers' transfer of its entire United States vehicle assembly operation
from South Bend, Indiana, to Hamilton, Ontario. The United States' position
as an exporter of completed passenger vehicles showed a decrease from 37,000
in 1958 to 27,000 in 1960 and 7,000 in 1963 increasing to 15,000 vehicles in
1964 (see Table 14).
Motor vehicle parts used for Canadian vehicles were made substantially
according to the same specifications as for United States vehicles. Re-
alizing the potential advantages of economies of scale through longer pro-
duction runs and the high cost of machinery, a greater per cent of the motor
vehicle parts were made in the United States factories, than in Canadian
9
factories (see Table 15). This observation is supported by V.W. Bladen.
Costly high speed, single-purpose machinery, the capacity of
which, in many cases, is in excess of the requirements for the
Canadian market, has developed [in the United States for these
parts] . The parts manufacturer in Canada with comparatively lower
volume output cannot, as a rule, expect to take sufficient
advantage of the economies that can be achieved with this type of
machinery to justify its purchase. He has had to adapt general
purpose machinery to his operation and, though he has not been able
to avoid adding something to cost. While on the average, labour
rates in the automobile industry are somewhat lower in Canada than
in the United States, the labour cost per unit in production
nevertheless tends to be higher in Canada by reason of frequent
changes in "setups" for comparatively small production runs.
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TABLE 12
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
Canadian consumption as a share of total United States-
Canadian consumption, by market segment, 1963-74,
January-June 1974 and January-June 1975
(in per cent)
Year
Passenger automobiles having
wheelbases measuring
—
100- 112-
Less than 111.9 119.9
100 inches inches inches
120
inches
or more Total
1963 0.8 5.3 5.3 9.5 6.4
1964 1.0 5.4 6.0 9.2 6.6
1965 1.1 5.1 5.8 9.4 6.5
1966 1.5 5.3 6.1 9.8 6.8
1967 1.8 6.8 6.5 9.1 7.2
1968 2.7 6.7 6.4 8.4 6.9
1969 3.1 6.9 6.5 7.3 6.8
1970 5.7 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.3
1971 5.1 7.4 6.3 5.9 6.2
1972 5.0 8.4 6.3 5.6 6.3
1973 8.0 8.4 6.6 6.6 7.1
1974 8.5 9.9 9.0 8.8 9.1
1974: January-June 7.3 7.9 7.4 7.8 7.6
1975: January-June 5.2 7.7 8.8 9.5 8.1
SOURCE: Canadian Automobile Agreement, op.cit., p. 230.
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TABLE 13
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles;
United States imports from Canada, by manufacturer
1960-74, January-June 1974, and January-June 1975
(in thousand of units)
Year
General
Motors Ford Chrysler AMC
Big
Four
All
other Total
1960 2 a 2
1961 — 1 -- - 1 a 1
1962 — 1 -- - 1 a 1
1963 -- 1 -- - 1 a 1
1964 — 2 — - 2 10 12
1965 -- 2 20 - 22 11 33
1966 3 62 85 9 159 2 161
1967 87 94 118 27 326 - 326
1968 118 180 149 33 480 - 480
1969 196 292 158 31 677 - 677
1970 127 304 209 42 682 - 682
1971 249 290 203 38 780 - 780
1972 205 356 224 52 837 - 837
1973 236 349 215 62 862 - 862
1974
1974: January-
265 311 183 43 802 802
June
1975: January-
154 164 106 30 454 454
June 128 110 114 18 370 370
SOURCE: Compiled from data on the destination of factory sales suppli-
ed to the United States International Trade Commission by the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association (United States).
^Fewer than 500 vehicles.
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TABLE 14
United States-Canadian-type passenger automobiles:
United States exports to Canada, United States exports to
all other countries, and total United States Exports, 1960-74,
January-June
,
1974, and January-June 1975
Year
U.S.
exports to
Canada
All other
U.S.
exports Total
Exports to
Canada as a
per cent of
the total
1,000 units 1,000 units 1,000 units Per Cent
1960 27 118 143 18.6
1961 16 125 141 11.3
1962 17 163 180 9.4
1963 7 187 194 3.6
1964 15 183 198 7.6
1965 47 158 205 22.9
1966 122 140 262 46.6
1967 246 120 366 67.2
1968 289 126 415 69.6
1969 286 131 417 68 .
6
1970 246 114 360 68.3
1971 352 111 463 76.0
1972 382 89 471 81,1
1973 476 103 579 82.2
1974 485 109 594 81.6
1974: January-
June 271 59 330 82.1
1975: January-
June 270 40 310 87.1
SOURCE: Compiled from data on the destination of factory shipments
submitted to the United States International Trade Commission by the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturer's Association (United States).
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TABLE 15
Canadian Exports and Imports of
Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories
Year Exports Imports Net^
1921-1925 17,949,433 73,045,733 - 55,100,300
1926-1930 15,009,920 176,288,551
-161,278,631
1931-1935 9,354,062 80,859,949 - 71,495,887
1936-1940 21,780,469 154,401,961
-132,621,492
1941-1945 530,350,044 367,136,397 +163,203,647
1946-1950 79,379,674 557,116,600 -477,736,926
1951 32,452,366 222,673,220 -190,220,854
1952 29,936,828 215,381,310 -185,444,382
1953 21,694,774 249,554,022 -227,859,248
1954 24,042,483 201,661,365 -177,618,882
1955 27,908,767 280,594,431 -252,685,664
1956 26,516,135 321,156,442 -294,640,307
1957 20,606,695 290,707,653 -270,100,958
1958 20,513,546 269,208,124 -248,694,578
1959 35,016,228 325,244,873 -290,228,645
1960 41,783,399 331,958,952 -290,175,553
1961 28,963,926 343,201,740 -314,237,814
1962 33,613,378 463,122,352 -429,508,974
1963 59,633,748 575,352,452 -515,718,704
1964 105,247,777 672,548,533 -567,300,756
1965 181,648,471 868,220,745 -684,572,274
SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association, Facts and Figures
of the Automotive Industry, 1966.
^Imports (-), exports (+)
.
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Tarif f structures of the United States and Canada before 1963. The
raost-favored-nation-tariff rates for automobiles imported into the
United States have been lower than those in Canada and after the Second
World War were 10% ad valorem. This rate continued to decline until it
was 6.5% in July of 1963. (The rate was reduced to 9.5% on June 30,
1956; 9% on June 30, 1975, 8.5% on June 30, 1958; 7.5% on July 1, 1962
and 6.5% on July 1, 1963).
The rates of duty on original parts was 25% ad valorem after World
War II which was later reduced to 8.5% in July, 1963. (The rate de-
clined from its 25% to 12% on January 1, 1948; 11.5% on June 30, 1958;
9.5% on July 1, 1962; and 8.5% on July 1, 1963).
The tariff rates in Canada for imported automobiles had not changed
much since 1936 at which time 17.5% ad valorem was the applicable rates
for both completed vehicles and most parts. Other parts were subject to
a 25% tariff. Certain parts that were not produced in Canada and were
to be used in completed motor vehicles, were allowed duty free entry in-
to the country. This concession was granted in the case that the parts
were used to meet a certain content requirement in the completed vehicle
and these percentages varied from 40, 50 to 60 per cent. The greater
the number of vehicles produced by the individual producer, the higher
the applicable content requirement percentage. Content requirements
refers to the percentage of factory cost, not including duties and taxes
incurred within the British Commonwealth.^^
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The Bladen Report . In August, 1960, V. W. Bladen was appointed a Royal
Commissioner with the duty of inquiring into the competitive positions
and prospects of the automobile and automobile parts industries and
recommending measures ’’to improve the ability of such industries to pro-
vide increased employment in the economic production of vehicles for the
Canadian market and export markets." This report presented seven
recommendations based on the above requests, the most important of which
was the "extended content plan." This plan was later put into effect
with tariff legislation of 1962 and 1963 and will be discussed later.
The plan was designed to increase the amount, and the efficiency, of
protection accorded to the automotive and especially the auto parts
manufacturers in Canada, and to extend such protection into the
subsidization of exports. These intentions, and their likely high cost
to the Canadian consumer were partly disguised by the Commissioner's
emphasis on the free trade and price reducing aspects of his plan and
his failure to recognize that tariffs collected on imports, though a
cost to the consumer, are not a cost to the country, and further, if
tariff receipts are traded off against increased domestic production
the Government may well have to replace the lost revenue by imposing
other taxes on the public. In addition the plan was designed to favor
the small producers, with the intent of preserving competition in the
industry.
The Report begins with a brief outline of the historical background
of the industry, which is particularly noteworthy for its statement
of
the economic intent and effects of the content provisions
introduced in
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the tariff revision of 1936. This outline discusses the development of
the Canadian automotive idnustry in relation to the strong economic
power of the European motor vehicle producers which had the advantage of
low wages and high technology and argues that accordingly the low volume
Canadian automobile producer is at a competitive disadvantage. The re-
port goes on to discuss various topics involving tariff administration.
V. W. Bladen takes a position between free trade and portectionism
in his recommendations. Free trade is rejected on the following ground:
"The decision was taken long ago to manufacture automobiles in Canada.
Today, many thousands of workers and considerable capital resources are
committed to the industry. Considering the state of development which
the automotive industry has achieved in Canada, it would be socially ir-
responsible to adopt any policy which might lead to its drastic contrac-
12
tion." The author understands the needs for protection in the early
stages of industrial development, however the industry had developed
considerably from the original 1910 Ford of Canada automotive plant.
The validity of this statement is eloquently contested by Harry G.
Johnson:
. . .
suffice it to remark here that the implied doctrine that no
mistakes should ever be admitted, and no errors ever corrected, if
anyone might be hurt thereby is an exceedingly poor basis for
intelligent policy making, especially in allegedly free-enterprise
economy, and a perfect recipe for the preservation of augmentation
of the ^steful inefficiency and the strangulation of economic
growth.
Increased protection is rejected by Bladen on the grounds that there is
a point beyond which the cost of having an automobile industry in Canada
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would be so high as to become politically intolerable to the consumer.
The Report also makes the point that tariffs at a much higher level would not
only involve resource misallocation but might so choke off demand as to
frustrate the expected expansion of the industry.
Basically, the plan was to assume an increased level of Canadian content
in the production of motor vehicles. This was achieved by duty remittance on
imported parts if the added Canadian content was equivalent. As H. G.
Johnson further points out:
... it is perhaps one of the most ingenious devices for evading the
rules of GATT yet invented, and a creditable product of the
Canadian penchant for devising schemes to apply genteel pressure
on the big American companies to change their policies in Canadian
operations--a penchant invariabley ind^^ged in at the ultimate
expense of the average Canadian citizen.
In conclusion, the favoring of the small producer of motor vehicle parts
conflicts with the intent of increased production in the Canadian market.
The development of the Canadian automotive industry is dependent largely on
the policies and practices of the large automotive producers. Restriction on
their production and the development through the extended content
requirement, which favors small producers of motor vehicle parts (through a
lower content requirement) minimizes the possibility of the development of
economies of scale.
Consequences of the Bladen Report .
October 1962 . Under an Order in Council, the 25% most favored-nation
tariff on automatic transmissions was suspended. This suspension was subject
to the condition that the Canadian content of automobile parts
exported by
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the producer exceeded that of the 12 month period ending October 31, 1962
(the base period). That is, for every dollar of Canadian content of
exports of parts during the base period from November 1, 1961, to October 31,
1962, duties would be remitted on a dollar of transmissions or engine
imports. The duty remittance also applied to stripped engines but was
limited to 10,000 engines for each producer.
October 1963 . The policy initiated by the Order-In-Council of October
22, 1963, (PC 1963-1/1544) expanded the previous October plan of remittance
of duty on transmissions and engines. Under the new Order tariffs on all
imports of motor vehicles and original equipment parts were to be remitted to
the extent that the Canadian content of exports exceeded that of the base
period (November 1, 1961, to October 31, 1962).
Paul Wonnacott made an interesting evaluation of the 1963 duty re-
mittance plan in relation to a free trade situation:
. . . there will be a restraint on the balance of trade arising from
automobile transactions with Canada having an overall automobile
balance which is favourable by at least the amount of Canadian
exports in the 1961-62 base period. This restraint will insulate
the Canadian market from import competition; thus, Canadian
automobile prices may remain considerably higher than those in the
United States. Also Canadian exports will be subject to U.S.
duties averaging between 6-1/2 and 8-1/2 percent. It is unlikely
that any large proportion of this tariff will be shifted to U.S.
consumers as producers; thus it will fall primarily on Canadians,
either in the form of higher automobil^yprices or in the form of
lower wages in the automobile industry.
The results of both the 1962 and 1963 duty remission plans appeared to
have been successful judging by the response of the supposed threatened
independent auto parts manufacturers in America. The duty remission
plans of
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1962 and 1963 were also referred to as the Drury Plan as discussed in the
first Chapter. The Honorable C. M. Drury was the Minister of Industry for
Canada during this time period.
Opposition to the Duty Remission Plans in the United States
. The plans
made no distinction regarding the end use of the exported parts which were
the basis for the duty-remission credits to the Canadian vehicle
manufacturers, and they had been adopted without consultation with or
agreement by the United States government. The exported Canadian parts could
be disposed of in the United States either as replacement parts or as
original parts. This possibility was seen by the American manufacturers as a
threat that subsidized low-cost Canadian parts would dominate their market.
Some also viewed it as a means by which the motor vehicle manufacturers, who
also supplied the United States "after market" could gain greater control
over that market by supplying it with less expensive Canadian-made parts. A
threat also was felt by the manufacturers of original parts also regarded on
similar grounds.
As mentioned earlier, the Modine Manufacturing Company of Racine,
Wisconsin, a producer of automobile radiators, filed a petition with the
Commissioner of Customs under Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The
petitioner charged that the Canadian export-incentive program constituted a
grant on the exportation of automobile parts to the United States and
requested a countervailing duty of 25% be levied on imports of such products
from Canada. On July 21, 1964, the Automotive Service Industry
Association, a trade association which then represented some 5,000 American
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producers, rebuilders and distributors of automobile parts filed a brief with
the United States Bureau of Customs in support of Modine's position.
On June 3, 1964, the Treasury Department instituted an investigation to
determine whether the Canadian export-incentive plan in fact constituted the
payment or bestowal of a bounty or grant within the meaning of Section 303.^®
On January 12, 1965, the Automotive Service Industry Association
together with four independent parts manufacturers filed suit against the
Secretary of the Treasury in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, asking a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued
compelling the Secretary to levy the countervailing duties under the
21
petitions of April 15, 1964, and July 21, 1964. On January 16, 1965, four
days after the suit was filed, the Automotive Agreement was signed and Canada
amended the Order in Council to provide that duty remissions would not be
paid as a result of any exportation after January 17, 1965. In view of
Canada's action, the Treasury Department terminated the investigation on
January 18.^^ The District Court action filed by the Automotive Industry
23
Association was dismissed without prejudice on May 18, 1965.
The Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between
the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada, and the "Letters of Undertaking
Relating to the Agreement
Introduction . On January 16, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson of Canada and
President Johnson of the United States signed the Agreement Concerning
AO
Automotive Products between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada (see Appendix A).
The three basic objectives appear in Article 1 of the Agreement. The
first is to create a broader market for automotive products to permit
achievement of the full benefits of specialization and large scale
production. The second objective is the liberalization of United States and
Canadian automotive trade in respect to tariff barriers and other factors
tending to impede this trade with the idea of participation in the expansion
of the North American automotive market on a mutually fair and equitable
basis. The third objective is the development of conditions in which market
forces may oeprate effectively to obtain the most economic patterns of
investment, production and trade.
Prime Minister Pearsen said at the time of the Agreement: "In effect we
have agreed to rationalize the production of our respective industries and to
expand our production and trade through a dismantling of tariff and other
barriers in the automotive field." Important to note is that free trade in
automotive products is not established, freer trade is, as involves the
Canadian importation of automotive parts and vehicles. Prior to the
Agreement, Canada permitted duty free entry of original-equipment parts of a
class or kind not made in Canada provided the manufacturers maintained
"commonwealth content" at 60% of the cost of production (for the Big Four) of
motor vehicles as mentioned earlier in discussion of the 1963 duty remission
plan. While new motor vehicles may be entitled to duty-free treatment by
the
Canadian government under the Agreement, this treatment is available only
for
vehicles imported by a manufacturer. Also while all original
equipment parts
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may now qualify for duty-free entry into Canada as opposed to only those of a
class or kind not made in Canada, the 60% "Canadian value added" requirement
effectively remains, including a few additional commitments. The most
immediate change of significance resulting from the Agreement was the repeal
of the duty-remission plan of 1963 (see Table 18). A summary of the American
and Canadian terms of the Agreement and of the commitments made by the motor
vehicle manufacturers to the Canadian government is presented in this report
(see Table 19). Following is a discussion of the obligations.
TABLE
16.
A
Comparison
of
Protective
Conditions
and
Restrictions
Imposed
by
the
Government
of
Canada
Affecting
Automotive
Production
and
Trade
Before
and
After
the
Agreement
42
VO
CO
•H
U
§1
a
(U
a
QJ
a;
u
oo
<
0)
Xi
O
B
o
4-»
<
c
'TJ
TO
C
TO
o
o
CO
TABLE
17.
United
States-Canadian
Automotive
Trade
Arrangement
43
0 i-H *4H •H a d d CO
44 d to 0 d U CO OkM
CO d d 43 0 u CO
44 CO 0 •iH d 44 d 0 CO dd V4 a d d d CO VO a COd d d rH d d d
a M X3 u <0 •iH CO >* d 43
44 d u d > 43 rH 43
•H 44 CO u d to d 44 d
a u d Q* u d d CO 44 d
a CO CO d rH 44 CO d CO0 *4H d d ^H d U u a •H
C-> d •r4 43 rH CO •rH CO •H
a 44 0 43 O, X 43 CO
rH CO 44 d d d d 0 44 43
CO x: d CO u d > 44 u » U
u d CO d d pH d Cu 0 d
di d a d > M CO mh d Oi U u
44 rH d u 0 44 > 0 a CO to 44
u u
•r4 V
' 43 >
<U O
> o
4J
d
(U
a
0)
OJ
u
to
<
43H
<0 O
(U <9
>* *H
M r-H
d oj d
QJ -TS <0
o o
a
d ‘H
o d
•H
4J d;U
d ^
'd
o d
U -H
to
(U ^ Ct
43 M ja o
4-> o u <C
<0 o
d
>> ‘iM
<M VH ^d o dd a; Vh -o Od U f-H -H
O 4J o 44
d *44 d
cr o m
0)
o d
I I
CO U
d d
to ns
CJ O
M-i a.
o
a>
OJ 43
d 44
rH
<0 d
> -H
U 'O
CO <U
r-4 ns
r~i ns
O <0
ns
Q)
(U d
43 r-l
44 (0
<u
> d
O CO
43 «H
<0 ns
CO a
•H d
^3 I
d i-H
CO CO
U >
(0 u
^ oj a> d
•H I-H >» > COO0«^ O ‘HH CM r-H
-d
V4 <0- O; M <0
o 'd
w o
53 ad c/}
CO >»<44 CO QJ
43 O <D 44
C/l V4 d
OJ W TS O I—
I
1-* 44 d
U M QJ
*H <0
43 dn QJ CO
<U ^ -H
> 44 44 X] dd Eh 43
*4-1 o; >> ^
o a 43
di • QJd -H d 00 >
o d o VO o
•H O^'H OV ^
44 (U r-» f—I CO
I
d VH OJ
M
a 00
aH OJ
d 43
QJ U 'H 44
d o
•H CO
43
a
>>
(0 4>
CO
<0 vO
ON
44
OJ
CO U
CO
*d oj
0) >v
•d
'd f-H •
(0 dJ 44
-d d
<u o d;
d a E
^ d
CO OJ
' dJ B ns
44 44 dJ <0
CO CO 44
44 d) -H O
CO M d 44
44 33
ns 'd
d) di d) <u
44 d) 43 'd
.H V4 44 d
a iH d)
I O 44
>>4J X
d> 44 d)
43 d 'd
44 d) CO
44 •rH
U 44 ‘H
0 CO a 4J
*4-1 43 •“ d CO
44 rH 43 d
CO •rl
CO 44 44 CO u
CO (34 0 d 44
d d d d 440 a u CO 3
pH CO X CO 44 0
44 W d -H w u
CO
oc
•H CO
tH 44 CO 1
43 u d 000 0 rH ‘H
I -d I
•H <U V-i
43 "d d)
dj d CO
> ^
U M
d) X o
CO <u '4M
o
>> CO
>-< I—I 44
d r—I J-l
P4 cO CO
u Qi
»—4 ‘H
CO *44 44
•H ’H d
U U QJ
d) dj a
Oh dJ
CO CO (4
<0
d» d; i-H
a M d,
o <0 d;
CO P3
CO
dJ ^
X
di
d) (0
)-( d;
CO 43
d
CO 44
d)
rH -d
U d
•H CO
43
QJ CO
> d)
00 'H
d 44
4J 1-4
CO r-4
•H <
X
d)
00 no
d <u
•H 'd
d
dj
U I
•w d •
43 d CO
o; CO d)
> a rH
u
^
'd
i-i d)
O ‘H
d*44
a ‘H
•r4 ^
CO
o ^44 oi o
I
o
I U CO
dJ d
^d a
d CO o
u
rH r-4 CM ‘H 1
> u
a
• 4^ o
'd 43 44 *4-1
a; 00 o
ns ns
d M <u CO
r-4 44 J-i
(J d; 'H d>
X 43 a >-<
dJ Eh •r4 d
r-4 44
d)^ u
M cn CO CO
(Q WH *4-4
u
d)
>> u
43 d
44
TO U
d) (0
44 *44
u d
o d
&§
r4
CO
dJ 44
43 U
CO
d d
CO
C4 44
d
CO OJ
44 ns
M d
CO <Ud d
d
d
<0
*44 a
U d
d) r-l
•d u
‘H
O 43
dJ
d >
o
u
d) o
U 44
CO O
d) ns
43 d)
44 ‘W
V4 *4-4 d >>
d> o -H -d
V4 d
d rH -d 44
44 gj dJ CO
u > 44
CO d> CO M-C
•H O
X
d; dj 44
a X
CO CO d>
CO CO 44
CD d
'‘43 O
44
-H
*4-1 44
•H C O
r—I -H d
CO CO "O
d 44 o
a* d
no d
d) rH 44
T? CO U
•H d CO
> 0^*4H
d
di
d) CO
CO
—s 44 U 43
<0 CO -H
«-/ dJ
E 43
> 44
d U
•9:3
d)
*44 >
o
u
44 o
d 44
d) o
B a
44
CO *4H
di O
di
>
I
V X
CO di
o
d rHd <3
u d
d d CO <0
CO u u 1 43 CO
CO di u 44 0 44 d
u rH 44 d 44 M <0
0 CO •iH 0 d d -H Qi U d
Mh d <0 44 d 44 e d CO
rH U d -H iH 43 0
CO U 44 CO d 0 rH CO 44
44 -H
M 43 rH
CO (U rHd > d
44
d
CO QJ
to di
d ^
•H CO
CO 44 cO a
u CO d U p4 CO
H d d CO <0 ‘H d
u 0 d d ^ ?- 0d •H u <0 0* •H
a 44 C4H C-3 *H d 44
<0 J 0 <0
00 >> a rH 44
•H 44 0 d CO •H
rH d u d d a0 ^ cO ‘tH •pH0
44
d
dj
B
d) CO CO
CO 'd
di <ud cu
CO CO
di d)
a *H .
o CO 'd
c/3 d)
CO ’d
d) d
^H ^ rH CM •r4W U U 'w' >
u u :
d *4H
I flj 44
o d 43 CO
44 -H 5 ad d 44
•d >-i r *4H
dl CO o
o
u
d CO
C4
CO X
di nsd dd ood
« d d
u u
d d *4H 44
(0 CO d
d >» d
r 05 C4H a
CO CJ ‘H
d rH 4J _
u ct CO d* d o
•H CO d d d 43 d
44 w a }*4 44 d
u u
d
d d
O ‘H
a
CO d
d
u d
o dd
CO d
d rH
44 U
<0 d
44 -H
C/3
dd 43
d
44 d
•tH CO
d d
a
d <0 d
43 43 43
44 44 44
uo
CO
SOURCE:
Canadian
Automobile
Agreement.
o£.
cit
.
44
Obligations of the United States under the Agreement
. Under the terras of the
Agreeraent, the United States is obligated to accord duty-free treatraent to
imports from Canada of motor vehicles and of parts for use as original equipment
in the manufacture of motor vehicles. This obligation, however, is subject to
r\ /
three major limitations."^
1. A number of special purpose vehicles are specifically excluded
from duty-free treatment, namely electric trolley buses, three-
wheeled vehicles, trailers accompanying truck tractors, and vehicles
specifically constructed and designed to perform special services or
functions
.
2. The Agreement does not apply to replacement parts of parts sold
in the after-market for use in servicing existing vehicles; it applies
only to parts and fabricated components for use as original equipment
in the manufacture of identified motor vehicles. In addition,
trailers, tires and tubes are specifically excluded from coverage,
whether for the replacement market or for use as original equipment.
3. Before Canadian products can qualify for duty-free entry they
must meet certain content requirements
,
which say that they can
contain only a limited amount of material produced in countries other
than the United States and Canada. Until January 1, 1968, motor
vehicles are limited to 60 percent of foreign content and 50 percent
after that date. Chasis and parts are limited to 50 percent foreign
content and is measured as follows:
Value of materials from third countries
Foreign content = Total appraised customs values of the
item on entry into the United States
The value of materials from third countries is calculated as the value
at the Canadian port of entry, exclusive of landing cost and Canadian
duty.
Obligation of Canada Under the Agreement . As for the United States, Canada is
obligated under the Agreement to accord duty-free treatment to imports from the
United States of motor vehicles and parts for use as original equipment in the
manufacture of motor vehicles. The limitations imposed by the Canadian
government include safeguards to guarantee minimum levels of Canadian
automotive production.
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The major limitations regarding imports into Canada are:^^
1. Certain special purposes vehicles, and chasis designed primarily
for them, are specifically excluded from the terms of the Agreement.
Some of these are electric trackles, buses, amphibious vehicles, off-
the-road vehicles, mobile crames, wreckers and other related special
purpose vehicles (see Annex A of Appendix A).
2. Replacement parts intended for sale in the after-market are
specifically excluded. All tires and tubes, both for replacement and
for use as original equipment are also excluded. The Agreement covers
only those parts and accessories and their sub-components that are
imported for use as original equipment in specified classes of motor
vehicles to be produced in Canada of that class of vehicle.
3. The right to import motor vehicles duty-free is restricted to
qualified Canadian manufacturers of specified classes of motor
vehicles. For the purpose of the Agreement, there are three separate
classes of vehicles: (1) pass^ger automobiles, (2) buses, and (3)
specified commercial vehicles. The right to import parts free of
duty is also limited to the same qualified manufacturers of vehicles,
but an additional provision specifies that independent parts-makers
who are producing components on order from these vehicle
manufacturers can also take advantage of the terms of the Agreement.
The third limitation is different than that stipulated by the United
States. It is designed to guarantee a continuing minimum level of motor vehicle
production in Canada. There are three criteria that must be met by Canadian
motor vehicle manufacturers to qualify for the right to import a given class of
motor vehicle and any required original parts into Canada duty-free.
The first criterion for qualification requires that the Canadian company
must have produced motor vehicles of the class under consideration in each
quarter of the base year which is defined as the 1964 model year (August, 1963,
to July, 1964). In addition, the company must have produced that class
of
vehicles in Canada during the 12-month period in which the importation
is made,
the periods to begin August 1 and end July 31. The Canadian
government has also
retained the right to give certain "non-qualified" producers
the right to duty
free entry.
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The second criterion is that in the model years following the designated
base year, the manufacturer must maintain the same ratio between the Canadian
vehicles which are produced and all vehicles of the class which are sold for
consumption in Canada is achieved during the base year.^® In no case can this
ratio be less than 75 to 100. This provision ensures the continuance of a
Canadian motor vehicles assembly industry. It also permits large companies to
rationalize their production by simplifying their product mix through longer
production runs achieving economies or near-economies of scale.
Rationalization of assembly facilities in this way can reduce the cost penalties
incurred as a result of the complex mix of vehicles typical of production.
Third, Canadian motor vehicle manufacturers must maintain at least the same
amount (in absolute dollar terms) of "Canadian value added" in the production of
vehicles of a class during the base period. This Canadian-value-added
requirement is approximately equivalent to the manufacturers' factory selling
price, excluding the cost of imported materials and parts used in the
manufacture of the vehicle. This ensures that the pre-Agreement mix of vehicles
will be at least maintained.
Commitments by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers . In addition to the com-
mitments under the Agreement itself, each of the major Canadian motor vehicle
assemblers submitted a letter of undertaking so as to "fully and equitably
participate in the expanding North American market" as requested by the Canadian
government. In these letters of undertaking two separate commitments were made
as follows (see Appendix A):
i. To increase the dollar value of Canadian value added (CVA) in the
production of vehicles and original parts in each model year compared
to the preceding model year. The amount of the increase is to be
47
approximately equal to 60 percent of the growth in the sales of
automobiles, trucks, and buses, by each company for consumption in
Canada
.
2.
In addition, to increase by $241 million the dollar value of
Canadian value added in the production of vehicles and original
equipment parts by the end of model year 1968. This increase is over
and above the absolute Canadian value added set as a minimum in model
year 1964 by the Agreement. The amounts of increase subscribed by the
major vehicle producers are as follows:
General Motors Corporation
Ford Motor Company
Chrysler Corporation
American Motors Corporation
All others
Total
Millions of Dollars
U.S. Dollars Can. Dollars
$111.9 $121.0
68.9 74.2
30.5 33.0
10.4 11.2
19.6 20.6
$241.0 $260.0
The first commitment guaranteed that Canadian production of motor vehicles and
original-equipment parts would grow proportionately to the growth in the
Canadian market. This commitment is not very different from the pre-Agreement
60% provisions for the free entry of automotive parts. This commitment to
expand Canadian value added in automotive production is not tied to specific
classes of vehicles or parts. Thus, this commitment could be met in any one or
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combination of the following ways:
1. Increasing the use of Canadian-produced parts and components in
its current Canadian vehicle production.
2. Increasing overall vehicle assembly in Canada through the ex-
pansion of its Canadian assembly facilities.
3. Exporting parts and components produced in Canadian captive
facilities to its United States assembly plants or overseas gen-
erally.
4. Purchasing parts and components for United States production and
overseas needs from independent Canadian parts manufacturers.
Alternatives 1 and 3 "... apparently resulted in pressure on United
States
parts manufacturers to expand or establish parts production
facilities in
31Canada.” Significant under this commitment is that growth in Canadian
production was guaranteed as a percentage of the growth in Canadian sales, even
though Canadian production includes a substantial amount of production for
export to the United States. This assumed a stable Canadian automotive industry
even though the United States industry was depressed at times.
The second commitment allows the Canadian automotive industry to increase
its absolute share in total North American production of motor vehicles. The
United States Tariff Commission estimated that this increase of $241 million in
United States dollars raises the minimum level of Canadian production of the
base year by about one-third.
Past studies and reactions to the Agreement .
”Some effects of the United States-Canadian Automobile Agreements”
H. Helmers, 1967. Ph.D., 1967, University of Michigan, Business Admin-
istration.^^ Henrik Olaf Helmers' study sought to determine "whether or not the
altered marketing and production structures within the automotive industry
(specifically the automotive metal stamping segment) by the United States
Canadian Automobile Agreement had ... a detrimental effect on the independent
producers of parts in Canada and the United States.”
The summary of Helmers' findings are:
1. The independent automotive stampers account for about 52 percent
of all automotive stampings produced.
2. The Canadian and American stampings industries are similar
in
both size distribution firms and in capability to produce.
3 The Canadians have lower labor and material costs
that can be
advantageous in price competition with the Americans, and they
have
the potential capability to produce for the new North American
Market.
But they lack a developed knowledge of that market.
The Americans,
although at some disadvantage in labor and material
costs, have an
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operating capability to produce for the new market. And they have a
working knowledge of that marketplace.
This last finding is significant to this study espeically since a later
report shows certain Canadian automobile prices higher than in the United
States. These figures are as recent as mid-1975.
Helmers concludes in his study that:
1. The Agreement need not be detrimental to either the Canadian or
American metal stampings segments of the industry, provided that each
recognizes its individual advantages and disadvantages and adjusts to
the new marketplace as it would in any new business situation.
2. The findings of the study cannot be applied to all the segments
of the automotive parts and accessories industry covered by the
Agreement. However, the study does provide guidelines for
ascertaining the probable changes in the competitive structure of
each segment.
3. An extension of this type of trade arranagement to other Canadian
and American industry sectors is possible. Consideration should be
given to the change in the competitive structure and the compatibility
of the trade arrangements with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
United States International Trade Commission Report on the United
States-Canadian Automotive Agreements. Its history, terms, and Im-
pact . The study involved a comprehensive analysis of the economic impact the
Agreement had on the trade balance in automotive products between the United
States and Canada, changes in production, investment, employment, and
related
areas
.
A brief overview of the results will follow, however a detailed
analysis of
this report represents a study in itself. One of the
concluding statements of
this report supports one of my reservations stated
earlier concerning
application of the Agreement to the Theory of International
Trade: "The
agreement as implemented by Canada is not a free-
trade agreement, and it has
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primarily benefited the Canadian economy. Another similar observation
stated in this report provides additional insight into the actual effects on
trade between the two countries.
OC
The statement reads as follows:
Indeed, when the agreement is examined in its totality, it is
manifest that the only true concessions granted in the agreement are
those granted by the Government of the United States according duty
free treatment to imports of automotive products manufactured in
Canada. Other than the provisions in the agreement providing for
consultations between the two Governments, the agreement contains no
substantive concessions on the part of the Government of Canada except
those that are subject to the commitments and obligations to the
Government of Canada in Annex A and the "letters of undertaking."
Following is a list of the major findings of this committee report.
1. Trade on automotive products between the United States and
Canada has increased vigorously over the past 10 years under the
agreement and the Canadian manufacturers have been able to an extent
to rationalize the production to take advantage of greater economics
of scale.
2. Canadian per-capita registration of passenger automobiles is
nearly equal to that of the United States.
3. Passenger automobiles sold in Canada continue to be relatively
more expensive at the retail level than comparable passenger
automobiles in the United States.
4. The impact of the agreement on automotive production in the U.S.
and Canada and the labour of automotive trade between the two
countries is influenced largely by the impact of the restructions
imposed as conditions for duty-free entry by the Government of Canada
in Annex A of the Agreement, and the commitments in the "letters of
undertaking.
"
5. Restrictions in Annex A did permit an immediate rationalization
of production pursuant to greater economies of scale.
6. The Canadian affiliates of the Big Four manufacturers have
consistently exceeded their 1964 rates of assembly to consumption for
passenger automobiles, since 1968 and the minimum "Canadian value
added" restriction in the production of motor vehicles in Canada is no
longer a significant restriction, due to the effects of inflation and
the growth in the Canadian market.
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7. If Canada had implemented the agreement without any restrictions
whatsoever, the balance of automotive trade would have changed
significantly in favor of the United States. (This suggests Canada's
perspective in regard to desired growth in automotive trade
exemplified through the restrictions in the Agreements).
8. The "letters of undertaking" benefit the original equipment
parts producers in Canada. This is because Canadian manufacturers can
meet their commitments to the Canadian government through sourcing of
original-equipment parts producing facilities in Canada.
9. The start up of assembly operations by motor vehicle
manufacturers, not established in Canada in 1964, contributed to an
additional increase in Canada's share of the United States-Canadian
motor vehicle production and employment.
10. The substantial deficit that existed during the 1968 through
1972 in automotive trade with Canada must have existed because of the
Canadian manufacturers substantially exceeding the requirements in
Annex A and the "letters of undertaking."
11. The capacity established by the Canadian affiliates of the major
motor-vehicle manufacturers, in anticipation of the meeting their
requirements for a growth in the Canadian market did not materialize,
became excess capacity in Canada, and since the United States is
Canada's only export market for the United States-Canadian type motor
vehicles and the United States market was relatively strong during the
years 1968 through 1971, the United States moved into a substantial
automotive trade deficit with Canada.
Reactions to the Agreement . Mr. Trezise, United States Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs, who was largely responsible for the writing
of the Agreement, says the concessions granted to the Canadian government were
to represent a transition from protected to free trade. He goes on to say. This
is a North American Auto Industry--the same companies, the same cars--I just
want to get the Canadian government out of the decision making part of the auto
business.
A
Canadian newsman told Iron Age , "It has worked so well for
Canada ... beyond our fondest hopes." He also pointed out that Canadian
auto
production is weighted toward small cars which would affect the automotive
trade
balance with the United States. Carl E. Beigie, an international
economist
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with Irving Trust Company said there has been a marked increase in efficiency of
Canadian plants, with auto production expanding three times faster than
38
employment.
Mitchel Sharp, Canadian Affairs Minister, said in regard to the re-
strictions on the Agreement that "... we are not prepared to say when the
39
safeguards should be removed." An international economist points out that
Canadians want to maintain the restrictions in order to keep the image of some
40
control even though the commitments have been far exceeded.
Edward N. Cole, President of General Motors in 1971, pointed out that the
"... sharp increase of cars manufactured outside North America has altered the
balance in benefits for both of our countries as a result of the Automotive
Trade Agreement ..."^^ In response, Jean-Luc Papen, Canada's Minister of
Industry, Trade and Commerce says the energies of both countries "... might well
be spent in meeting this challenge." He goes on to say that "... the Agreement
has been and should continue to be for both parties, one of the most successful
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trading arrangements in either country's history."
An article in Iron Age^^ said the "... trade arrangement is advantageous to
multinational automakers. They can ignore borders and concentrate on maximizing
the efficiency of all North American productions and distribution operations."
Then President Nixon suggested in his annual report to Congress on
the
Agreement, "retention of the restrictions in the agreement would be
contrary to
the premise on which the U.S. entered the agreement and that
the three
transitional restrictions-Canadian value added tax, production
sales value and
duty-free entry to manufacturers only--were no longer
warranted and should be
44
eliminated.
"
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Richard J. Fordick reports in his 1974 article in Automotive Industry :^^
'While there are any number of areas ripe for improvement, it is also obvious
that the Agreement has played an important role in the shaping of the North
American auto industry, providing many benefits for both sides." Ian Anderson,
A.M.C. Vice President of Finance, noted that even a small company, such as
American Motors Corporation, could not compete if it were forced to duplicate
Its manufacturing facilities in both countries. This would have resulted
without the Agreement. A dissenting note was given by United Auto Workers
President, Leonard Woodcock, in his request for the elimination of the price
differential between the higher Canadian auto prices and the United States auto
prices
.
Conclusion
The Agreement has increased the size and economic capabilities of the North
American Automotive industry. Canada has had more to gain due to the relative
inefficiency of the Canadian automotive industry to the United States industry
prior to 1965.
The Agreement once signed by the governments of the two countries became a
vehicle for the "rationalization of automotive production" for the Big Four
automobile companies operating both in the United States and in Canada prior to
1965. The effectiveness of the Agreement will be evaluated in the following
chapters.
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Early Trade Thought (1500-1750)
Mercantilism and the rise of the nation-state . The centralization of
authority within the four most powerful European governments began in France,
in the reign of Louis XI (1461-83). In Spain, another of the four great
powers of the early modern period, national unity was achieved in 1469, with
the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. The reigns of
Henry VII (1485-1509), Henry VIII (1509-47), and Elizabeth I (1558-1603) saw
a similar process of cetnralization in the government of England. The Dutch
Republic was the last of the four nations to become a state, achieving
independent status in 1609, after forty years of conflict with Spain.
^
With the consolidation of European nation-states came early attempts to
describe international trade in terms of theoretical principles. Speci-
fically, the theory of mercantilism describes international trade as it
developed among these centralized governmental units, whose independent
existence determined the mercantilists' principle objective--that of
increasing the power and wealth of the state. The mercantilists held that,
in order to achieve this objective, a nation should always strive to prohibit
the outflow and encourage the inflow of such precious metals as gold and
sil-
ver. This exaggerated emphasis on individual accumulation of
bullion
(bullionism) is described by August Hecksher as follows:
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Within the state, mercanitilsm pursued thorough-going dynamic
ends. But the important thing is that this was bound up with a
static conception of the total economic resources in the world; for
this it was that created that fundamental disharmony which
sustained the endless commercial wars. Both elements together
implied that the position of a particular country could change and
was capable of progress, but that this could only happen through
acquisitions from other countries. This was the tragedy of
mercantilism. Both the Middle Ages with their universal static
ideal and "laisse^ faire: with its universal dynamic ideal avoided
this consequence.
Underlying the concept of mercantilism was a principle very similar to the
present-day monetary approach to a country’s balance of payments which holds
that a nation can only gain through foriegn trade if it has a favorable
balance, or if the value of its exports exceeds that of its imports.
The decline of mercantilism . In the eighteenth century, primarily because
of the increasing wealth and influence of the businessman, the market began
to operate as a freer system in which supply and demand were the primary
determinants of price. Price fluctuations, therefore, corresponded to
fluctuations in the market. Restrictive price regulations by such government
agencies as the English Privy Council gave way to market regulation of supply
and demand.^ Mercantilist overemphasis on accumulation and hoarding of
wealth received continual criticism. Clearly a new theory of international
trade was needed to describe this shift of emphasis.
It was during this period that John Locke and Dudley North further de-
veloped the quantity theory of money. The basis of this theory was similar
to the principle behind today's fluctuating currency exchange system
in that
the supply of money adjusts itself automatically among nations according
to
the needs of trade.'* Prices reflected the flow of the
currency. Bavid Hume
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analyzed this principle of price-specie
be summarized as follows:^
flow in a series of theses which can
underselling lill lead to a flow o^*sS toThe"^^/
cZ^ry^: tuZbr^Z^^E^IZlTy^
“tlTrelationship between national price lewis
A freely floating system of exchange will, in theory, fluctuates as one
country's currency becomes abundant and therefore less valuable in terms of
its power to purchase imports, while its exports become less expensive in
comparison to those of other countries. The currencies of the other
countries weakens correspondingly, and the system moves back towards
equilibrium as the original weak country’s currency gains strength.
Classical Trade Theory
Mam Smith and David Ricardo. After Hume, Adam Smith became the guiding
economic spirit of his day with the publication of his eminent work The
jfealth of Nations (1776) . As an apostle of free trade Smith showed that
trade among nations enables each to increase its real wealth by taking
advantage of the principle upon which all increase of wealth rests, the
division of labor.
is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to
attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to
buy. The taylor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys
them at a shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his
own clothes, but employs a taylor. The farmer attempts to make
neither the one nor the other, but employs those different
artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their
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whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over
their neighbors, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or
what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever
else they have occasion for.
What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be
folloy in that of a great Kingdom. If a foreign country can supply
us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better
buy it of them with some part of the produce of ou^ own industry,
employed in a way in which we have some advantage. .
.
Adam Smith spoke only of absolute advantage, however. He assumed that
trade would not take place unless each participating country could produce a
particular good at a lower absolute cost than any other country. He failed
to recognize that countries could trade profitably with only a comparative
advantage. It was David Ricardo who, with his Principles of
Political Economy (1817), developed a more viable explanation of trade. He
propounded a theory of value in which he assumed that the value of any
commodity in international exchange depended upon its relative or compara-
tive labor cost rather than on its absolute labor cost.^ As Ricardo ex-
plained it, the comparative cost explanation of trade depended on the
immobility of capital:
Experience ... shows that the fancied or real insecurity of capital,
when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with
the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country
of his birth and connections, and intrust himself, with all his
habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the
emigration of capital. These feelings, which I should be sorry to
see weakenend, induce most men of prosperity to be satisfied with a
low rate of profits in their own country, rather than seek ^
more
advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations.
Although David Ricardo primarily explored the supply side of trade,
his views
continue to have general relevance to today’s international
trade practices.
In the following section the timeliness of his insights
in the light of some
examples of present-day thought will be demonstrated.
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Extensions of the Classical Theory
The Hecksher-Ohlin model
. Eli Hecksher and his student Bertil Ohlin
expanded Ricardo's theory of comparative cost to include increasing and
decreasing cost industries where Ricardo had assumed constant costs. The
Hecksher-Ohlin explanation of trade can be summarized in the following
manner: (1) different goods require different factor proportions, and (2)
different countries have different relative factor endowments. This second
assumption takes into account the chance of two countries' having the same
factor proportions (i.e., land, labor, and capital) by postulating different
9factor efficiencies. In this latter case demand for goods in both countries
would also have to be similar. The real world of trade involves many goods,
different supply-and-demand patterns, and technological differences, all of
which create a variety of trade possibilities among all nations of the free
economic world.
The Product Cycle Hypothesis . » According to another theory, developed by
Raymond Vernon, international trade is based less on "comparative cost
doctrine and more upon the timing of innovation, the effects of scale econ
omies and roles of ignorance and uncertainty in influencing trade patterns.
Vernon suggests through his product cycle model of international trade that
*The Product Cycle Hypothesis of International Trade must not be confused
with the Product Life Cycle of Marketing.
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there are three stages in the trade cycle of a product: (1) the new product
stage, (2) the maturing product stage, and (3) the standardized product
stage. The time period for the completion of the stages and the shape of the
cycle will be determined by the income elasticity of the product, the degree
of economies of scale within the industry, and the international tariffs and
transportation costs.
In the new product stage of Vernon's trade cycle, the product itself may
be quite understandardized. Its inputs, its processing, and its final speci-
fications may be only broadly determined. There is also a low price
elasticity of demand for the output of individual firms, owing either to a
high degree of product differentiation or to the existence of monopoly market
power. In this first stage the need for effective communication with all
phases of the market is critical. There is usually considerable uncertainty
about specifications of inputs needed for production, and about the
specifications most likely to result in the manufacture of a successful
product
.
In the maturing product stage, a certain degree of standardization
usually takes place. Production processes become cost efficient as
cost
cutting becomes a primary motive in product output. Efforts to
achieve cost
efficiency force the commitment to mass output, which should
result in
economies of scale for the producer. The producer may also
consider a shift
in production facilities, depending on the marginal
production cost and the
balance between export transportation costs and the
average projected costs
of production in the market of import. In the
later part of this stage, if
production facilities have been set up overseas, as
is often the case, the
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possibility of exporting back to the United States may have to be taken into
account. In a situation where economies of scale are being fully exploited,
and the free trade exists, the principle differences between any two
locations are likely to be labor costs.
An interesting observation by Raymond Vernon, in his presentation of the
product cycle hypothesis, supports the discussion in Chapter I of the
decision-making process of mangers. It reads as follows;
Any hypotheses based on the assumption that the United States
entrepreneur will react rationally when offered the possibility of
a lower-cost location abroad is, of course, somewhat suspect. The
decision-making sequence that is used in conncection with
international investments, according to ^^rious empirical studies,
is not a model of the rational process. But there is one theme
that emerges again and again in such studies. Any threat to the
established position of an enterprise is a powerful galvanizing
force to action; in fact, if I enterpret the empirical work
correctly, threat in general is ^^more reliable stimulus to action
than opportunity is likely to be.
Such threats may come when local manufacturers begin to lose market
power to imported goods, for instance, or when local governments become
concerned with promoting employment and balancing their trade accounts.
Thus, the decision to invest internationally may be based primarily on loss
of market share, or possibly on loss of a market.
In the final stage of Vernon's product cycle hypothesis, the standard-
ized product may be exported by less developed countries because
of the
comparative cost advantage of their production location. The
Hecksher-Ohlin
theorem would not support this possibility, since it would
predict that
exports of the less developed countries would tend to
be relatively more
labor-intensive. Hecksher and Ohlin leave marketing costs
out of their
theorem because they regard market information as
being instantaneously
available. Market information is necessary, however,
and costly.
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If we can assume that highly standardized products tend to have a
well-articulated, easily accessible international market and to sell
largely on the basis of price [an assumption inherent in the defini-
tion]
,
then it follows that such products will not pose the problem of
market information quite so acutely for the less developed countries.
This establjYhes a necessary if not a sufficient condition for
investment.
The uncertainty over the applicability of necessary external economies
to the less developed countries diminishes the scope of the product cycle
hypothesis. Such external economies should be applied to skilled labor,
repairmen, reliable power, spare parts, raw materials, the processing of
industrial material according to exacting specifications, and so on. In the
automobile industry the necessary external economies may not be practicable
even though the production process may be highly standardized.
Applicability of the Product Cycle Hypothesis to the
North American Automobile Industry
In speculating about the product cycle hypothesis and its applicability
to the automobile industry, fairly clear-cut set of economic characteristics
will be assumed. The local production process must require significantly
less expensive inputs of labor} otherwise there is no reason to expect a
lower production cost in less developed countries. The products should have
a high price elasticity of demand; and their production process should not
rely heavily upon external economies.
Products which could be precisely described by standardized speci-
fications and which could be produced for inventory without fear of
obsolenscence would be more relevant than those which had less
precise specifications and which could not easily be ordered from
remote locations. Moreover, high-value items capable of
absorbing
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significant freight costs would be more likely to appear than bulky
items low in value by weight. Standardized textile products are,
of course, the illustration par excellence of the sort of product
that meets the criteria. But other products come to, mind such as
crude steel, simple fertilizers, newsprint and so on.
The first criteria of high labor content would not seem to apply to
automobile manufacture. Even though the labor input is highly significant,
it is balanced by a capital input of almost equal significance. Moreover,
even if the capital were readily available, the external economies necessary
for the production of motor vehicle parts and vehicles discourages subsidiary
manufactures in less developed countries.
The absence of adequate marketing and manufacturing knowledge necessary
for success in the automobile market has thwarted many attempts by entrepre-
neurs to enter into the U.S.-Candian market. In 1974, the Big Four automo-
bile manufacturers (American Motors Corporation, Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors) represented 99.9 percent of the total United States production by
20
manufacturers,^^ and 100 percent of the total Canadian production. The
U.S. Canadian automobile market has also been dominated by sales of domestic
rather than foreign automobile types. In 1975, imports represented 15.7
percent of the total United States consumption of passenger automobiles and
16.2 percent of the total Canadian consumption of passenger automobiles.
In the United States this represents an increase of 7.9 percent since I960.
In Canada, however, there has been a 13.9 percent decrease in
imports during
the same period. One could argue that the increase in the
percentage of
United States imports is evidence in support of the product
cycle hypothesis.
It may well be more reflective of a high income
elasticity of demand for
imports. This, along with the rise in affluence among
U.S. consumers, had
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meant that U.S. -based automobile manufacturers have become less and less able
to meet the increased demand for small economical passenger cars. The
principle that a market is better served from within is supported in this
case by the success overseas of United States multinationals and, more
recently, by the production of Volkswagen automobiles in the United States.
The U.S . -Canadian automobile market is best served by firms producing in the
U.S. and Canada. There may be shifts in dominance among these firms,
especially if such corporations as American Motors and Chrysler capture less
of the total automobile market while foreign firms producing in the United
States gain a greater market share.
The product cycle hypothesis of internation trade is insightful and
provides a more precise explanation for world trade than did earlier
theoretical efforts. Nonetheless, its applicability to the automobile
industry of the United States and Canada is minimal, and we must look to
other models for more exact and usable correspondences.
Economic Integration and the Automotive Agreement
The Automotive Agreement of 1965 is an initial step in the cooperation
TITi s perspective" is shared with Dr. Paul Wonnacott of the University
of
Maryland and Dr. Donald Daly of York University. Their insights
were pro-
vided in personal interviews while the author was in Washington,
D.C. in May,
1978.
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of two nation-states for common economic benefits through the efficient use
of the resources. It represents the first stage in the process of economic
integration between nations. The following section will elaborate on this
process to more fully understand the Agreement as a possible precursor to
further economic cooperation between the United States and Canada.
Charles P. Kindleberger and Peter H. Lindert propose five stages of
22
economic integration. The first stage concerns the establishment of a free
trade area and is of primary importance to the U.S. -Canadian Automotive
Agreement. In this stage an agreement is reached between two or more
countries to eliminate tariffs in one or more industries. In the case of the
United States and Canada, both countries agreed to eliminate tariffs on
restrictions, which are outlined in Chapter II, impose some limits on the
scope of free trade between the two nations and will be addressed in more
detail in a later chapter. The point to be emphasized here is that the 1965
Agreement represented a ’’freer" trade agreement than existed previously
however not explicitly free trade.
In the second stage of economic integration a customs union must be
agreed upon. Similar in most respects to a free trade area, a customs union
differs in that it is necessary for those contracting countries to
have
common external tariffs. The implementation of these first two
stages of
integration can affect trade and welfare in two possible ways. It
can result
in the creation of more trade, when the demand for each
country s goods
increases as more goods are traded between the partners
and fewer with the
outside world not covered in the free trade area. However,
the terms of the
new agreement may specify a shift from a low-cost
outside supplier to a high-
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cost supplier. In this case, the result would be a trade diversion. The net
effect must be considered, taking into account the magnitude of the
differences between costs to the participating countries before and after the
free-trade agreement or customs union. It has been recognized that the more
countries there are that join the customs union, and the lower the common
external tariff is, the less will be the trade diversion, and the more nearly
2'i
will the customs union approach the free trade ideal. The ideal objective
of free trade is trade creation, which exercises a positive effect on the
welfare of all members of the trading world.
The next three stages of eonomic integration are the common market,
economic union, and complete economic integration. A common market covers
free movement of goods as well as the factors of production, labor, and
capital. Economic union goes fruther and provides for the harmonizing of
national economic policies. Complete economic integration would require the
establishment of common monetary and fiscal policies and other commonalit:
in the macroeconomic area.
A Test of the Hecksher-Ohlin Model
Intra-industry Trade . Now it is necessary to return to the Hecksher-Ohlin
model of international trade and consider its relation to economic integra-
tion. The case under consideration will be the European Economic Community
(Common Market) which was formed in 1957. Before the agreement to form the
community was reached, some countries feared that entire industries might
fail because of their lack of comparative advantage. What in fact
occured.
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however, was an increase in intraindustry trade. It was found that the
expansion of trade in the Economic Community did not take the form the
Hecksher-Ohlin model had predicted--that is for example, the exchange of
German cars for French wines--but instead resulted in the exchange of German
cars for French cars and German wines for French wines.
While the basic Hecksher-Ohlin model explains trade between
industries, which we call interindustry trade, the studies of
economic integration in Europe revealed the importance of trade
involving commodities b^^^onging to the same industry ... known as
the intraindustry trade.
In an effort to measure this situation more precisely, Herbert G. Grubel
and P.J. Lloyd developed the following index:
It implies that for a given industry the index of intraindustry trade (B) is
at its maximum of 1.0 when exports equal imports, and the ratios in this
equation is zero. On the other extreme, when an industry either has exports
but no imports or vice versa, the index becomes zero because the ratio is
1 . 0 .
2^
In the European Economic Community, this index of all industries on the
average increased from 0.54 in 1959 to 0.67 in 1967. L.N. Willmore found
that trade in manufactures among countries of the Central American
Common
27
Market showed an intraindustry index of 0.22 in 1961 and 0.40 in 1967.
Intra-industry trade and the Auto Agreement . When the intraindustry
trade
index was applied to the United States and Canadian automobile
industry, the
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following results were determined;
1960 1965 1967 1971 1974
Calculated
"B" .05 .41 .85 .97 .89
It is apparent from the above calculations that the degree of intradustry
integration was quite significant for the U.S. -Canadian automotive market.
These results will be analyzed in greater detail in the following chapter
where the economic integration that has taken place in the U.S. -Canadian
automobile industry will be evaluated.
This index was calculated for Canada and U.S. trade in automotive products.
The statistics were derived from: Review of the North American Automotive
Industry
,
Automotive Task Force, Ottawa, Canada, 1977.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MEASUREMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY
OF THE AUTOMOTIVE AGREEMENT
General Hypothesis Development and Procedure
Origins of the hypotheses . The foundation of this study is international
economics and specifically free trade theory. The theories upon which these
hypotheses were developed have been described in Chapter III. The literature
was exhaustively reviewed in attempts to come up with specific measures for
evaluating the efficiency of the Agreement. The most helpful source was an
unpublished study by Dr. Paul Wonnacott of the University of Maryland.^
Dr. Wonnacott considered the Canadian consumer-taxpayer and automotive
hourly wage earner to be the most affected by any efficiency gains that may
have occurred in the U.S. -Canadian automobile market due to the Agreement.
This perspective is based on the relative inefficiency of the protected
Canadian automobile industry previous to the signing of the Agreement in
1965. As product and plant specific economies of scale are achieved, the
Canadian-consumer-taxpayer and automotive hourly wage earner would be
expected to gain through increased automotive wages, increased automotive
profits, or lower relative prices. This chapter attempts to isolate
the
effects the Automotive Agreement has had on Canadian automotive
prices and
'See discussion in Chapter V under Hypothesis #2.
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wages and the degree to which integration has occurred in automobile produc-
tion between the United States and Canada.
Technique of analysis
.
(See Appendix B) . The limitations of available data
restricts the choice of alternative methods of evaluation of the Agreement.
Therefore, given the small sample size of 16 years (1960-1976), the standard
test for significance will be the Students' t-test. The significance level
of .05 for the two tailed test (0.25 in each tail) has been chosen based on
the compromise between the low control conditions of the data which suggests
a smaller level of significance (e.g. .001) and the support of the hypotheses
by theory which suggests a larger level of significance (e.g. .10). An
additional test of significance is used to extract any significant change in
the slope and/or intercept of an ordinary least squares line predicting the
variables individually. These results are presented in Table 29 at the end
of this section. Data for the Canadian statistics is provided by Statistics
Canada and data for the United States comes from the U.S. Bureau of Census
and U.S. Department of Commerce.
In all cases, the data has been evaluated with 1965 serving as the
watershed or statistically stated treatment year. When the data is broken
into two separate groups, 1960-1966 and 1966-1976 periods provide the before
and after treatment distinction. The assumption is made that 1965 is
part of
the before treatment group due to the necessary litigation procedures
of both
countries following the signing of the Agreement which is taken
to be one
year.
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Procedure for hypothesis evaluation
. Each hypothesis is first stated as it
appears in the dissertation proposal. Following each hypothesis is: (1) a
discussion of how the hypothesis is tested; (2) evaluation and conclusion of
the statistical result; and (3) the statistical results.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1
Hypothesis . Integration of automobile production has occurred more
significantly than if the Agreement were not signed, as measured by the
changes in imports of the United States and Canada from one another.
Evaluation procedure . Prior to 1965, Canadian automobile producers
operated with a 2% cost advantage over U.S. producers in the Canadian market.
This cost advantage was the residual advantage after the 17-1/2% import
O
duty. Canadian producers were competitive in their own market, however,
subject to competition from the efficiently produced U.S. automobiles. One
could expect U.S. exports to be significant in the Canadian market but
Canadian exports insignificant in the U.S. market prior to 1966. But one
would expect U.S. imports from Canada to grow significantly after 1965 due to
model and plant specialization after the implementation of the Agreement.
In terms of the specific data, Canadian and U.S. automobile imports
should grow significantly after 1965 as model specialization occurs in both
countries and plant specialization occurs in Canada. The economies of scale
that one would expect to occur in Canada after the Agreement should
result in
there being a significant difference between pre 1966 and post 1966
U.S.
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imports. In order to account for what would have occurred in absence of the
Agreement, the pre 1966 relationship between the U.S. and Canadian imports is
shown. It is hypothesized that if the Agreement had a significant effect on
integration of the U.S.
-Canadian automobile industry, the post 1965
relationship of the import statistics should be significantly different from
the pre 1966 period. This result should show up in the change in U.S. imports
pre to post 1966 (inclusive) as Canada gains in its share of the market. This
hypothesis is tested in the following section.
Evaluation and Conclusion . U.S. automobile imports increased signifi-
cantly after 1965 (see Table 18 and 19). The results lead one to conclude
that the Agreement had a significant effect on the degree of integration in
the U.S. and Canadian automobile industry.
One must also observe the results of what would have occurred in the
absence of the Agreement presuming that the assumptions are correct as to
what constitutes "in the absence" of the Agreement for this hypothesis. The
^ A, A
data in Table 29 for variables Y^, Y^, and Y^ shows a significant change
in the slope of the line after 1965. There is also a significant intercept
A ^
change for Canadian automobile unit (Y
2 )
and dollar (Y^) imports, and U.S.
A
automobile dollar imports (Y^) • These results indicate the Agreement has had
a significant positive effect on both U.S. and Canadian imports ofAAA
automobiles. Therefore, the results in Table 28 for variables Y^, Y2 , Y^
and
A
Y^ indicate the positive results would not have occurred in absence of the
Agreement.
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Hypothesis #2 .
Hypothesis . Efficiency in Canadian automobile production has increased
significantly following the Agreement as measured by the increase in Canada's
share of North American automobile production compared to its increase in
automobile employment and also as measured by the degree of effective
protection which should show a decrease in excess costs of production in
Canada versus the United States.
Evaluation Process . The Canadian automobile manufacturers were commit-
ted to Canadian $260 million increase in automotive production facilities by
the end of model year 1968. Thie requirement in the short run transfered
production from the efficient U.S. producers to the inefficient Canadian
producer in attempts to achieve economies of scale. After the tooling up of
production facilities occurred, economies of scale would begin to appear in
the form of increased output with lower labor per unit of output as compared
to the pre 1966 levels. A more precise measure would be the labor
input per
unit of output of the pre 1966 period versus the post 1968 level.
However,-
for the purposes of consistency of results between each
hypotheses, the 1960-
1966 period is compared to the 1966-1976 period.
In order to determine the efficiency of the
Canadian automotive
industry, three distinct measures are used. The first
of the three measures
compares total Canadian shares of U.S. -Canadian
automotive employment. The
pre 1966 period will serve as the measure in
absence of the Agreement. The
relationship of the pre 1966 period with the post
1966 period is also shown
to clarify the changes of the two periods.
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The second measure estimates the efficiency per unit of Candian value
added with the use of the formula derived for effective protection:^
x= 'LzM
C(1 + T - W7) - (T - UV)
Here, X stands for the excess cost per unit of Canadian value added, with T
representing the Canadian-U.S. price differential for cars (average), C the
percentage of Canadian content and UV the percentage of the value of the car
paid in tariffs on parts. The excess cost of Canadian value added should
decrease over the period, as the Canadian industry develops economies of
scale. General inflationary pressures are considered in evaluating these
results, however a more thorough investigation of price changes relative to
other industries will be considered under the third hypothesis. Data was
available only for the years 1964 through 1975 with 1970 data not available.
Therefore, the issue of "in the absence" of the Agreement is not specifically
evaluated for this measure of efficiency.
The third measure uses an ordinary least squares line to predict each of
the variables over the 1960-1976 period. Slope and intercept changes
are
sought to infer a causal relationship between the Agreement and
Canadian
automobile production and employment.
Evaluation and conclusion . According to the first measure,
efficiency did
occur in the Canadian auotmotive industry after the
Agreement. This
conclusion is supported by the significant change in the
relationship of the
pre vs. the post 1966 (inclusive) data for both the
Canadian shares of total
U.S. -Canadian automotive production and total
employment (See Tables 20 and
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21) . Additional insight is also provided by the pre 1966 versus the post
1966 data for each variable (See Tables 20 and 21).
The results for the second measure of the excess cost of Canadian value
added are not as conclusive. These results show excess costs decreasing from
12.9% in 1964 to 8.5% in 1969 to 7.9% in 1975 (See Table 22). However, the
significance of these results are less pronounced considering after 1965
there was a 3% reduction in costs due to the elimination of the tariff on
original equipment parts. Inflationary pressures were strong in Canada
during this period, however, these pressures were greater in the United
States in the same period. This insight is gained from looking at the
Canadian industrial selling price* index for automotive and household
furniture and fixture industries and the U.S. wholesale price indexes for
automotive and household furniture and fixture industries (see Table 26)
.
Further insight is given to the inflationary pressures operating on the
Canadian automotive industry in the following section on the welfare of the
Canadian consumer-taxpayer
.
The third measure of efficiency shows an insignificant change over the
pre and post period for Canadian shares of automobile production
empl9yment
>
and Canadian total automobile production and
A
employment (Yg) . These results clearly outweigh the positive results of the
first measure (See Table 29).
'The Canadian Industrial Selling Price Index is comparable to the U.S
Wholesale Price Index.
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In conclusion, improved efficiency of the Canadian automobile industry
has not occurred after the Agreement. An additional statistical test was
used, suggesting further the statistical inconclusiveness of the results
(see Chapter 5, hypothesis #2 for further elaboration of this test).
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Hypothesis #3 .
Hypothesis
. The consumer-taxpayer of Canada is "better off" following
the Agreement as measured by the benefits of lower relative prices offsetting
the tariff revenues lost.*
Evluation Process
. The Canadian consumer-taxpayer economic position
may be judged to have improved if the fall in automotive prices has more than
offset the decline in tariff revenues. The author assumes the tariff
revenues lost to be 3% of the factory price of vehicles as indicated in the
previous section on Canadian excess cost. If the price differential between
Canadian and U.S. made cars has been reduced below the 3% loss in tariff
revenues, the consumer taxpayer is judged to be better off after the
Agreement. The significance of a slight versus a large dispersion in the two
figures is left to the reader's interpretation.
Canadian and U.S. automotive prices are subject to inflationary
pressures present in the prospective economies. Therefore, inflationary
pressures should be considered in determining the effects of the Agreement on
automotive prices. If the inflationary pressures are evidenced to be less
significant in the automotive industry relative to other durable good
industries, stronger support may be given to Agreement associated benefits to
the Canadian consumer-taxpayer . Specifically, if the pre and post 1966
differentials of industrial selling price indexes are shown to have increased
the consumer- taxpayer has benefited.
'"The author would like to emphasize the normative nature of
such a measure
consistent with the literature on consumer welfare.
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The author has selected the furniture and fixture industry in Canada and
the United States for comparison to the automotive industry in order to show
the inflationary pressures operating on another durable good industry. The
author recognizes the difference in capital intensity between the two
industries which may confound the results. However, classification of
available government statistics limits the choice of comparable durable good
industries. Also, the statistics of the furniture and fixture, industry are
consistent with the overall durable good industry statstics reinforcing the
author's choice.
The Canadian industrial selling price price indexes of each of the two
durable good industries are subtracted and compared for the pre 1966 with the
post 1966 period. The United States wholesale price indexes (comparable to
Canadian industrial selling price index) of the two industries are treated
the same as the Canadian statistics. The U.S. differentials are used as the
case of "in absence of" the Agreement because of the insignificance of the
Agreement on the efficiency of the U.S. automotive industry. An additional
test is used to test for significant changes in the slope and intercept of an
ordinary least squares line for the furniture and fixture and motor vehicle
industrial selling price indices individually to extract any causal effects
the Agreement may have had on the motor vehicle industry wholesale price
structures
.
Evaluation and Conclusion . The average differential for the two
automobiles produced in Canada and the U.S. after 1965 of 8.2% and 8.4% is
not large enough to cover the 3% loss of tariff revenues (see
Table 23).
Compared to the average of 1964 and 1965 price differentials
of 9.6/o and
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9.2%, the benefits of lower relative prices shows only a 1.4% and 1.2%
reduction in the price differential (see Table 23). The results for the
imported automobile are even less significant considering an average
differential of 14.5% after 1965 compared to the average differential of 30.5
for 1964 and 1965. The 16% reduction in the price reduction in the price
differential is not large enough to account for the 17-1/2% price reduction
attributed to the elimination of the Canadian pre-Agreement tariff. Thus,
the first test of the relative position of the Canadian consumer taxpayer as
measured by lower relative auto prices versus tariff revenues lost indicates
the Canadian consumer-taxpayers is not "better off."
The second measure of the welfare of the Canadian consumer taxpayer
indicates a significant improvement after 1965. The automotive products
industry has resisted inflationary pressures significantly better than the
other durable good industry, the household furniture and fixture industry.
The results show a significant difference for the pre and post 1966 years
significant at the .006 level of confidence (see Table 24).
The additional test for slope and intercept changes for the two in-
dustries shows a high degree of significance for the pre versus the post
Agreement period. However, these results indicate that one cannot con-
clusively say that the Agreement was the cause of the change in the motor
vehicle industrial selling price index. (See Table 29, variables Yg and
Yio)-
In summary, the consumer-taxpayer of Canada has not improved
his/her
position as measured by lower relative prices versus tariff
revenues lost.
To further test this hypothesis, a regression equation
was developed for the
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1961-1976 period based on a 1952 U.S. Department of Commerce model for
predicting automobile registrations in the U.S. The new model attempted to
predict Canadian consumption of U.S. -Canadian automobiles. The results
further indicate statistically, the inconclusiveness of a positive causal
relationship the Agreement has had on consumer welfare. The results are
further elaborated on under Hypothesis #3 in Chapter 5.
The welfare of the Canadian automotive worker is considered in the
following section.
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Table 23
Canadian Price Differential Over (Under) U.S. Price
For Three Popular Automobiles* (Percentages)
2 door**
6 cylinder
coupe
4 door'*'*
8 cylindar
sedan
2 door***
8 cylinder
hardtop
1960 - 1964 (N.A.)
1964 9.6 9.2 30.4
1965 9.6 9.2 30.6
1966 7.2 6.6 24.7
1967 6.8 6.3 8.7
1968 5.7 5.9 8.7
1969 4.2 5.6 10.0
1970 (N.A)
1971 10.1 10.6 13.0
1972 12.1 12.5 15.2
1973 11.2 11.5 14.1
1974 12.4 12.2 14.7
1975 4.6 4.6 6.3
Average 1966-1975 8.2 8.4 14.5
^Converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rate.
**Produced both in U.S. and Canada.
*^'*Produced in U.S., imported into Canada.
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Hypothesis #4
Hypothesis . The wage earner in the Canadian automobile industry is
better off following the agreement as measured by the gains in wages in
Canada, and also gains in economic rents as compared to similar employment in
the durable goods labor market.
Evaluation Process . As a result of the Agreement, the Big Four automo-
tive manufacturers (Ford, General Motors, Chrysler and American Motors)
increased Canadian value added of $260 million (Canadian) by the end of 1968
model year, plus 60% increased in content requirement for each successive
year above the base year 1964. Associated with these increases in production
were increases in Canadian automotive employment. It may be deduced that the
Canadian automotive workers gained by these additional employment
opportunities. However, it is assumed that the automotive workers would have
been employed in absence of the Agreement. Therefore, gains to the
automotive worker would appear in the form of economic rents which exclude
factors other than differences in wage rates of the next best employment
opportunity. This opportunity would logically be in other durable good
industry employment. Thus, differences in wage rates between the durable
good manufacturing wage and the automotive wage represents the benefits to
the Canadian wage earner associated with the Agreement.
The author has sought to find a significant change in automotive wages
from before 1966 to after 1966 along with the relative differences
between
durable good wages and automotive wages over the 1960-1976
period. In
addition, the differentials between the general manufacturing
wage and the
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automotive wage of both U.S. and Canada are tested for significance before
and after 1966. These results are presented to show how the wage earner in
the automotive industry fared relative to general manufacturing industries
before and after the Agreement and also in relation to the United States.
One would expect the pre and post 1966 differentials to be signficantly
different for Canada and the post 1966 differentials to be closer in line
with the U.S. differentials. These expected results are supported by the
success of the United Automobile Workers Union (UAW) at achieving wage parity
for the Canadian automotive workers with the U.S. automotive worker in 1970.
Theoretically, these results are supported by the factor equalization
theorem of Paul Samuelson which states that free trade will equalize not only
commodity prices but also factor prices regardless of the factor supplies or
demand patterns in the two countries.^ The following section will
distinguish the benefits to the Canadian automotive wage earner.
Evaluation and Conclusion . Economic rents for the Canadian automotive
wage earner has increased from $.47 (U.S.) in 1960 to $.64 (U.S.) in 1966 to a
high of $1.06 in 1973. Wage "parity" was achieved with the U.S. auto worker
in 1970 with slight variations accounting for exchange rate fluctuations.
Based on the results in Table 26, a significant change is observed between
the pre 1966 and post 1966 period for Canadian motor vehicle hourly wages
based on a 95% degree of confidence. The significance of these results are
somewhat lessened when one considers that the pre and post 1966 hourly
wages
for the durable goods industry also were significantly different.
There also
was not a change in significance in the pre and post 1966
relationship of the
motor vehicle hourly wage compared to the durable good wage
(see Table 27).
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The lack of significance in these later measures may be confounded by the
inability to extract the automotive industry wage from the average durable
good wage.
The differentials in the Canadian and the U.S. market inspires a high
level of confidence for the pre vs. post 1966 data (see Table 27).
However, the evaluation of slope and intercept changes in the ordinary least
squares line for the manufacturing, durable good and automotive wage rates
shows a significant change in both the slope and intercept for U.S. and
Canadian wage rates. This would lessen the ability to infer a positive
causal effect of the Agreement on the wage structure of the automotive
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
industry (see Table 29, variables ^14 ? ^15 ^16^*
In summary, the hourly automotive wage earner of Canada has benefitted
after 1965. The wage earners in general manufacturing and durable good
industries have also improved their position after 1965. Therefore, one
cannot conclusively say the Agreement has caused the improvement in wage
rates
.
Average
Hourly
Earnings
for
Canadian
Motor
Vehicle
Production
&
Related
Workers
Durable
Good
Manufacturing
Workers*
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Hypothesis #5
Hypothesis. The wage earner in the United States automobile industry is
worse off following the Agreement, as measured by the loss in employment
which shifted to Canada in the form of lost economic rents. These workers
would have to seek employment in lower wage industries.
Evaluation Process . The assumed loss to U.S. automotive labor as a
result of the Agreement is difficult to quantify because of the impact of the
monetary and fiscal measures taken by the U.S. Government. Therefore, the
quantity change in U.S. automotive employment is excluded from consider-
ation. The significant issue is the amount of loss in economic rents as the
potential wage earners of the automotive industry must presumably seek
employment in the next best alternative. This alternative is the durable
goods industries excluding the automotive industry. The economic rents are
considered purely in the differences in hourly wage rates between general
durable good industries and automotive industry. Also, durable good hourly
wages are compared to automotive hourly wages pre and post 1966; as well as
each separately over the pre and post 1966 periods; no hypothesis of expected
outcome of these later results is proposed. If significance appears,
observations will follow.
Evaluation and Conclusion . The automotive wage earners of the United
States that would have been employed in the absence of the Agreement
have
lost increasingly in the terras of economic rents. The hourly wages
of the
next best suitable employment in the general durable good
industry shows an
increase in the differential with the motor vehicle hourly
wages over the
has incrased from a $.46 (U.S.) difference insixteen year period. This gap
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1960 of the automotive wage earner over the general durable good wage earner
to $1.02 in 1968 to a high of $1.48 in 1974. These differences appear as a
weekly wage loss (40 hours) of $18.40 in 1960, $40.80 in 1968 and $59.20 in
1974.
Thus, if the assumption of employment loss to the U.S. automotive wage
earner due to the Agreement is correct, the loss in economic rents loss
increased to put the U.S. wage earner in a "worse off" position after the
Agreement.
The following Chapter integrates the results from this hypothesis and
other hypotheses to determine if the expected benefits and gains to the
automotive industry of the United States and Canada have been achieved.
Along with this assessment, suggestions are provided for modifications and
alterations in the Agreement and the implications for continued free trade
between the U.S. and Canada.
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FOOTNOTES
Paul Wonnacott, "The U.S. -Canadian Automobile Agreement of 1965: The
Early Effects," Working Paper Series, Bureau of Business and Economic
Research, University of Maryland, August 1968.
2
Sanford Labovitz, "Criteria for Selecting a Significance Level: A Note
on the Sacredness of .05". The American Sociologist
,
Vol. 3 (1968), 220-22.
3
See Paul Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott, Free Trade Between the
United States and Canada : The Potential Effects
,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1967).
^Paul Wonnacott, op. cit.
,
p. 3.34. It is an elaboration of the formula
for effective protection presented in Harry Johnson, "The Bladen Plan for
Increased Protection for the Canadian Automotive Industry," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science
,
May 1963, p. 142. When the
price differential, X becomes effective protection rather than excess cost.
^Kindleberger and Lindert, International Economics , op. cit., p. 86.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Effectiveness of Rationalization of Canadian-U . S
.
Automotive Production
Objectives of the Agreement
Restatement of the Objectives . The objectives of the 1965 Automotive
Trade Agreement as stated in Chapter I of this study and as written in
Article 1 of the Agreement:
(A) The creation of a broader market for automotive products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large scale
production can be achieved;
(B) The liberalization of the United States and Canadian automotive
trade in respect to trade barriers and other factors tending to
impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of both countries
to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total
market of the two countries;
(C) The development of conditions in which market forces may
operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment,
production, and trade.
These objectives are now evaluated in relation to the results
from the
hypothesis tests of the preceding chapter.
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Summary of the Hypothesis Results
.
Hypothesis #1 . Integration of the U.S. -Canadian automobile market
has changed from the 1960-1966 levels. Integration was measured by the
changes in automobile imports for the pre and post 1966 period.
These results may be confounded in the future by the greater increase in
Canadian automotive demand for North American vehicles (Big Four) relative to
U.S. demand resulting in a long-term deterioration in the Canadian automotive
trade balance with the U.S. This stronger demand growth is expected to
persist until 1985. If Canada retains its 1976 share of North American
production through 1985, the indications are that the automotive trade
deficit with the United States would be about 2.4 billion (1976 Canadian
dollars) in 1985. In 1976, Canada's share of North American production was
12.5% for motor vehicles and 6.6% for independent and captive automotive
parts producers. The present (1977) deficit in automotive trade with the
U.S. is $1 billion (Canadian) with a $2 billion deficit in automotive parts.
^
Automotive investment in Canada has been in the labor intensive sector
of the industry (i.e. assembly and independent parts manufacture), where
prior to 1970 the Canadian wage rates were lower than in the U.S. Since the
early 1970' s however, there has been a drastic reduction in overall
investment due primarily to the loss of this cost advantage as wage parity
was achieved resulting in the use of U.S. production facilities of
automobile
assembly of amounts over the "floor" requirements in the "Letters of
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Undertaking."* This cost advantage does again appear with the Canadian
dollar weakening relative to the U.S. dollar.
Hypothesis #2 . The efficiency of the Canadian automotive market
has not significantly improved since the 1965 automotive agreement. There
is, however, an improvement in the output per automotive worker in Canada in
the 1966-1976 period. This has occurred through plant and product specific
economies of scale (mentioned briefly in Chapters 1 and IV)
.
Plant specific economies refer to the reduction of per unit manu-
facturing or production costs through the effect of different plant sizes
(for a given state of technology) . This effect on per unit costs has been
recognized for many decades. Product specific scale economies however, have
only been recognized since the Second World War. Generally, this notion
refers to changes in cost per unit of output with longer lengths of
production run. Different factors can operate to reduce total costs per
unit. Overhead costs are spread over longer runs, leading to lower costs per
unit of output. Learning curves rise as employees evolve better methods of
carrying out the same tasks, so lower variable costs on wages occur. Cost of
mrterials decline with large volume purchases. Finally, at a certain level
of production, efficiency may indicate a major change in the production line
or assembly operation, involving larger and different machinery and
3
production techniques which would lower per unit costs.
The result of the hypothesis tests however, remain statistically
in-
X
See Appendix A.
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conclusive especially after a regression was run for the 1961-1976 period.
The regression equation is as follows:
y = + P2^2 ^3^3 ^
where
:
y = Change in Production of U.S. -Canadian type automobiles in
units
= Constant (y-intercept)
X
2 =
Change in investment for Canadian automobile plant and
equipment in millions of 1971 Canadian dollars
x^ = Change in Canadian automobile employment
x^ = Dummy variable with value of "0" for 1961-1966 and
"I" for 1966-1976
The regression explained 39% of the variation both with and without the
dummy variable (x^) . Although this is not a high regression coefficient, the
insignificance of the dummy variable and slight change in the "y intercept
in the regression reflects the non-causal effect of the Agreement on the
efficiency of the automobile industry.
Product and plant specific economies of scale occurred in the Canadian
automotive industry through the significant increase of investment
in
production facilities to meet the $260 million required increase by 1968.
Also, Canada is now producing fewer models for both the U.S.
and Canadian
market eliminating the need for fewer line changes and
also increasing the
length of production runs.
Donald W. McEwan, Chief of Motor Vehicles Division
of the Department of
Industry, Trade and Commerce in Ottawa, however
informed the author of the
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continued presence of model changeovers. These changeovers may be for two
similar car models, however, inefficiencies were present due to downtime in
specific assembly line changes.
Also confounding the efficiency of the Canadian automotive industry is
the presence of a maximum 48 hour workweek in the Province of Ontario. This
factor lends to inefficiency through the need to retain more workers on the
payroll to meet the peak demand periods rather than the use of overtime.
This is a problem the author terms as structural and beyond the capabilities
of the Agreement as it is presently written.
Hypothesis #3 . The Canadian consumer-taxpayer ' s relative position
has not improved after the Agreement as measured by lower relative prices of
comparable automobiles produced in Canada and the U.S. However, at the
wholesale price level, there has been relatively lower increases in
automotive prices versus those of another durable good industry. This
indicates improved efficiency at the production level, however, these
efficiencies are not passed along to the consumer as indicated by the
insignificant decrease in automobile prices.
Some of the factors tending to increase prices of automobiles
are
4
included in the following list:
Taxes
1 .
2 .
3.
apital tax on assets (e.g. Ontario rate of 1/5 of 1/,);
ederal sales tax on building materials
;
ederal sales tax on auxiliary production
machinery an
quipment
.
no
Duties
Custom duties
:
1. Paid on imported materials used in the original equipment of
automobile parts;
2. Paid on the imported materials used in the manufacture of
automobiles
;
3. Paid on imported building materials and components;
4. Paid on imported machinery, equipment and auxiliary capital
items
.
Manufacturing Costs
1. Cost of imported components from parent companies in U.S.
(transfer pricing);
2. Cost of Canadian "vendor" items (e.g. tires, trim, etc.);
3. Assembly plant production mix penalty (product specific
diseconomies of scale).
Marketing Costs
1. Advertising: the result of
a) broad range of product;
b) geographically widespread market (i.e. 100 miles by
3000 miles)
;
c) two official languages.
2. Support of regional sales offices;
3. Support of regional parts distribution centers;
4. Average Canadian dealer markup higher than average U.S.
dealer markups
.
Warranty
1. Climatic conditions;
2. Servicing limited market on broad base;
3. Other cost factors resulting in higher Canadian warranty
costs over those experienced in the U.S.
Canadian Buyer Behavior
1 . Preferences of Canadian buyer: a) Tendency of
Canadian
purchaser to specify not only fewer options per vehicle
but
less expensive options per vehicle, (e.g. loser Canadian
rate
of original equipment manufacturers installation
of air
conditioning); b) Tendency of Canadian purchaser to buy
fewer
deluxe models within a range.
Ill
This list comprises the more significant factors lending to higher
relative prices of automobiles in Canada. It is interesting to note that
preliminary statistics for the wholesale price of 1978 cars shows Canadian
prices below U.S, prices by 1.3%. These results reflect the dynamics of the
freely fluctuating exchange with the Canadian dollar 12%-15% below the value
of the U.S. dollar, (see Table 39) A further measure was used as discussed
in Chapter 4 under this hypothesis. The regression equation for the 1961-
1976 period is as follows:
y = + ^2^2 + P3
X
3
+ - p^x^ + p^x^ + 8
where:
y = Canadian Consumption of U.S. -Canadian type automobiles in
units
x^ = Constant (y intercept)
X
2
= Canadian disposable personal income in 1971 Canadian
dollars
x^ = % change in disposable personal income to preceding year
in 1971 Canadian dollars
X, = Canadian consumer price index for automobiles to consumer
price index for all items
x^ = Non U.S. -Canadian type automobiles consumed in Canada
x^ = Dummy variable with a value of "0 for 1961 1966
and
"1” for 1966-1976
The regression was run with and without the dummy
variable (Xg). The
regression coefficient (R^) remained at 71.3% in
each regression equation.
The F-test was significant at 95% in each
equation. The T-test for the dummy
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variables, however, was insignificant and the regression coefficient was
also insignificant. These results suggest that the treatment (Agreement) had
little effect on Canadian consumption of U.S. -Canadian type automobiles.
A "Chow test" was considered to test for a significant change in the
regression coefficients for the pre and post Agreement period. However, the
lack of degrees of freedom for the pre 1966 period would not allow the test.
The results for this regression represent a significant area for future
research in the U.S. -Canadian automobile industry. However, it remains
outside the research question of this study.
Hypothesis #4 and #5 . Canada's gain in automotive employment and
earnings does not reflect Pareto optimal results and thus a loss to U.S,
automotive workers. There was an increase in Canada's percentage of total
Canadian-U.S. automotive employment from 8.97o in 1965 to 11.2% in 1976. This
represents a 2.3% loss in employment to the U.S. automotive workers.
The increased proportion of Canada's share of Canadian-U.S. automotive
employment can be attributed partially to Canadian automotive activities
being concentrated in labor intensive assembly operations. Also,
the
employment is less skilled than comparative automotive employment
in both
vehicle assembly and parts manufacture. The distribution of
employment in
these sectors of the automotive industry of both
countries for 1976 in
5
percentages is as follows:
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Table 30
Vehicle Assembly Parts Manufacture
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
Non-Skilled 73% 49% 51% 33%
Semi-Skilled 23% 42% 34% 57%
Skilled 4% 9% 15% 10%
This data reflects a growing inequity in the distribution of total
investment towards labor intensive rather than capital intensive sectors in
the Canadian automotive industry. This inequity may cause the Canadian
automotive industry to become less competitive in world automotive trade as
Canada's comparative advantage has been lost due to nominal wage parity.
This comparative advantage may again appear as the Canadian dollar is
depressed on world markets. The most significant question, however, is
whether the lower value of the Canadian dollar is perceived as long-term
condition and thus a factor in corporate decision making.
The following table shows a more drastic decrease in investment in
parts
manufacturing versus vehicle assembly.
Table 31
Canadian New Investment as Percentage Shipments
Year Vehicle Assembly Parts Man.
1965 4.1
1967 3.0
1969 1.1
1971 0.7
1973 1.2
1975 1.1
1976 0.9
14.2
7.9
6.9
4.3
3.4
2.8
1.9
Source
:
Statistics Canada 31-001
The above table shows the level of investment in Canadian vehicle
assembly has remained relatively stable since 1969 and the level of
investment in parts manufacture is trending downwards. This decrease
reflects a shift in investment into the U.S. and a reliance on foreign
suppliers of automotive parts by U.S. auto manufacturers. Automotive parts
produced outside the U.S. and Canada are allowed to enter duty free if the
vehicle contains at least 50% North American content. This situation of a
decrease in investment in capital intensive sectors and its effect on the
future competitiveness of the Canadian automotive industry is addressed
briefly in the following section and comprehensively in the following final
chapter
.
Conclusion
The Agreement has lent to improved efficiency in the automotive industry
of Canada and thus the U.S . -Canadian automotive market. The benefits
appear
in the form of a significant increase in employment, wages and lower
relative
wholesale prices of automotive parts. The objectives of the Agreement, based
on the rationalization of automotive production, have been
achieved to a sig-
nificant degree.
However, shortcomings in the agreement as it is written
indicate the
need for modifications to better fit today's priorities
of U.S. and Canadian
consumers, taxpayers, laborers, and stockholders.
One modification would
include some guarantee of continued investment
in Canada above the 60%
Canadian value added commitment by the automobile
manufacturers in the
letters of undertaking.
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This added clause would also specify the type of investment in order to
assure Canada of its fair share of both the labor and capital intensive
investments. Guarantees, such as this reflect other than primarily economic
considerations. These other considerations are addressed in the following
chapter.
Table
32
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Footnotes
^"The Automotive Industry in Canada," Sector Profile. Government of
Canada, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1977, p. 8.
2
"The Automotive Industry in Canada," Ibid .
,
p. 3.
^Donald J. Daly, "Economies of Scale and Canadian Manufacturing"
(Downview, Ontario; Prepared for Seminar, "Appropriate Scale for Canadian
Industry," October 19-21, 1977), pp. 3-10. Also see D.J. Daly, "Empirical
Applicability of the Alchian-Hirshleifer Modern Cost Theory" (York
University, mimeo, 1975).
^Summer of 1978 Memorandum, Motor Vehicles Division, Department of
Industry, Trade and Commerce, Government of Canada.
^"The Automotive Industry in Canada," 0£. Cit . , p. 4.
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CHAPTER VI
NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR U.S. -CANADIAN TRADE
Humanistic Paradigm
Introduction. The basic premise of the Agreement is one of freer trade with
the desired outcome of rationalized automotive production across the United
States/Canadian border. The guiding principle has been the theory of
comparative advantage with certain guarantees insuring Canada of its fair
share. However, Canadian labor has achieved nominal wage parity thus losing
its cost advantage in wages. And as observed by Mr. John Kotyk
(International Government Relations, The Ford Motor Company), the Ford Motor
Company would prefer to produce in the U.S. due to lower capital costs
and
the presence of the ’'Knowledge Center" in Dearborn. The decreased
value of
the Canadian dollar does uncover cost advantages for production
in Canadian
facilities over the U.S. However, the impact of the Canadian
exchange rate
on the investment decisions of the Big Four automakers
has yet to be
determined.
As a result of the previous analysis in this
research paper, the author
believes in the need for other criteria for decision
making in the U.S.-
Canadian antomotive market. These criteria follow
from the perspective of
all the participants , and not only the decision
makers in the multinational
firms
.
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Definition
. The humanistic approach to rule making and evaluation centers
around man-created rules developed through observable individual and
collective behavior. These rules are a "set of instructions or a body of
knowledge which provide that under certain identifiable circumstances, the
individual is to respond in a particular fashion if he expects to achieve a
certain result."^ The problem of the researcher in the social sciences is to
determine the outcomes of a specific rule or rules and based on this
evaluation suggest changes so as to better serve the participants in the
system.^
The structure for rule making and evaluation lies in the paradigm (e.g.
humanistic paradigm) . "A paradigm can be defined descriptively as a set of
initial perceptual assumptions as to what the nature of the fundamental
entities of the social world are and how they interact with one another;
normatively, it postulates a set of values or preferred human end states to
human existence and how these might appropriately be achieved individually or
3
collectively."
The Humanistic approach and the Agreement . The Agreement serves as the
logical means/ends relationship between the government of the United States
and Canada. The objectives of the Agreement represent the criteria for
evaluation as appears in Chapter IV. The results show some benefits
to the
Canadian consumer/taxpayer in the form of lower relative price
increases in
the automotive sector compared to the general manufacturing
sector. The
Canadian automotive wage earner has gained through the
significant increase
in employment and wages
.
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However, as a result of the Agreement investments have been increasing
at a decreasing rate in Canada and these investments have been in labor
intensive sectors, i.e. assembly operations versus capital intensive parts
manufacturing. This outcome will minimize the benefits to the Canadian side
of the automotive industry as cost efficiency dictates production in the
lowest cost centers, the U.S. automotive plants. In order to improve the
overall operations of the U.S. -Canadian automotive industry, criteria must
arise to insure a continued overall balance in the benefits to all
participants
.
Comparative advantage is a guiding principle in world trade, developed
in a world with many economic participants as explained by Adam Smith's
principle of atomism. However, today's world of fewer and more powerful
entities requires other considerations beyond comparative cost theory in
order to insure the benefits for the whole. The force and power of the
multinational corporations must be clearly understood.
The New World System of Multinational Corporations
Introduction . So far, no theory whether political, social or economic
exists
to account for the world economy and therefore, for the
behavior of the
multinational corporation.^ Therefore, any serious attempt to
understand
the behavior of the multinational corporation or
explain its behavior
involves consideration of sociology, politics, psychology,
and culture as
well as economics. The allocation of scarce
resources, through the operation
of comparative advantage is only part of the
world system. Consideration
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must be given to the effect the multinational corporation has on the total
world system and its accountability to a soverign power.
Definition of multinational . Jack W. Behrman, a former Assistant Secretary
of Commerce, and a leading academic analyst of global corporation, suggests
that the most important criterion for determining whether a corporation
should be called multinational is centralization of policy and the
integration of key operations among affiliates. The world corporation has
taken the eighteenth century economic dicta about comparative cost
advantages and division of labor and applied them on a global scale for the
5
maximization of profits.
Different perspecitves of the multinational enterprise . Kari Levitt be-
lieves that in order for a multinational firm to be most effective, attempts
have been made to make foreign cultures as similar to the U.S. culture in the
form of capitalistic values and norms. She believes "homogenization" of the
free world value structures is a major objective of the multinational firm.
There would be less need for the tailoring of products to meet the
diversified world markets having different cultural, technological,
political and economic values. She believes that the new colonialism of
the
multinational corporation is coined by the ideology of materialism,
liberalism and anti-nationalism. She further states, "If the nation
state is
a barrier to the efficient production of material goods
by international
corporations then, in this liberal view, the nation state
is regressive
reactionary and obsolete."^
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8In an article by Heather Dean she states the economic allocation of
scarce resources, which is a major conflict between multinational firms and
host governments would be best served by a supernational body. This body
would centralize prices and allocation of scarce resources with a
consideration for the total free world market. Anthony Sampson believes
however that "for the great part of the welfare of individuals must continue
to reside with the nation around which the whole apparatus of taxation and
the welfare state has been constructed. Nationalism in this function, is far
from outdated ... the nation is the only institution strong enough to stand up
to the multinationals, and to instill comparable loyalties, for the
foreseeable future, and it is only the nation that can redress the present
imbalance. The concept of sovereignity may seem an old fashioned and
misleading one, but it expresses well enough the basic conflict and political
i9
question, 'Who is going to provide the context and shape of men s lives?
Jean Jacques Servan-Shreiber clearly states, "The multinational corporation
will be disruptive if a political power does not develop to put the economy
at the service of man, and not put man at its service. (humanistic
perspective)
Barnet and Muller make some interesting statements with regard to the
multinational corporation:
The global corporation is the first institution in human
history dedicated to centralized planning on a world scale.
Because its primary purpose is to organize and to integrate
prnnomic activitv around the world in such a way as to maximize
global profits and global market shares.
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fundamental assumption is that the growth of the whole enhances, the
welfare of all the parts. Its fundamental claim is efficiency.
Charles P. Kendleberger
,
one of the U.S. authorities on international
economics, states, "The international corporation has no country to which it
owes more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels completely
at home .
"
Barnet and Muller point out the managerial dilemma of the nation-state:
Large corporations plan centrally and act globally, and
nation-states do not. It is this difference that puts governments
at a disadvantage in trying to keep up with and control the
activities of global corporations. As individual business units
become more powerful and mobile, as their balance sheets become
less and less accurate, reflective of real economic activity,
government finds itself handicapped, administratively and
politically, in regulating the economy with traditional Keynesian
methods. The ease with which global corporations can conceal or
distort information vital for the management of the economy is
creating the same sort of administrative nightmare for the
advanced indust^al state that underdeveloped countries have lived
with for years
.
And further present a humanistic perspective:
The success of a social system ultimately depends upon the
achievement of balance. It needs social balance, which avoids the
dangerous concentration of wealth in a few hands. It needs
ecological balance, which avoids the misuse of natural^
resources. . .Finally it needs psychological balance which avoids
the human costs of alientation--a process of enslavement that
takes place, as Marx wrote, when the power has given to things
"sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force." We need a
holistic perspective for evaluating the quality of growth. The
impact of the peculiar system of growth associated with the global
corporations on social, ecological and psychological balance must
be examined together. The achievement of balance in one
sphere at
the sacrifice of another cannot produce a system that works
in any
lasting or human sense. The empirical evidence to date casts
great
doubt on th^3 capacity of a global system to achieve
such
equilibrium.
Multinational corporations have contributed to the
shrinking of the
world's geography. Through the media of multinational
enterprise, goods.
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capital, men, women, management and technology have spread internationally;
unquestionably the multinational corporation contributes to a smaller
14
world. It is up to the individual to determine if this smaller world is a
better world.
On the subject of destroying national sovereignty and creating de-
pendent relationships, Mira Wilkins believes that economic strength and
political sovereignty are linked, foreign investors that aid economic growth
contribute a material basis for the enhancement of national sovereignty. She
does believe, however, that foreign investment does provide a challenge to
national sovereignty when it reaches a certain size or when it is in a vital
industry (i.e. automobile industry), but nations do have the power to limit
foreign investors. The exercise of this power may, in the author's
opinion, force a cutback in operations by the home corporation for the
political risk index has now increased.
Peter F. Drucker believes that the multinational corporation satisfies
the economic promise that demand creates supply; and since demand exerts the
pull, the multinational business is in every case a marketing business. He
believes that the multinational corporation has exposed, for the first time
in three hundred years, that economy and sovereignty are becoming
divorced
from one another. What has emerged is an autonomous world
economy which is
not just the sum of national economies. And in a world that is threatened
to
be destroyed by nationalist passions, the multinational
corporation is an
important institution.
These diverse perspectives provide timely insight
critical to the
issues of national sovereignty a critical issue
in the development of a
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humanistic perspecitve in which individual and collective behaviors and
insights provide the basis for change.
Solutions to the issue of sovereignty and the power of multinational
corporations . The author believes in the opportunity of each country to
determine their social, economic, and political directions and their level
and speed of development in these areas. The multinational corporation has
represented a change agent for many cultures toward a more similar political,
economic and social world. This very change has been hailed and condemned,
as was previously pointed out, depending on the perspective of the individual
host country. The author further believes in the necessity of this
institution's answerability to a governing body other than the economic
forces of demand and supply and the theory of comparative costs.
The multinational corporation is not answerable to a sovereign power due
to its worldly economic flexibility. Attempts to control multinational
corporations in host countries are hardly achieved, especially due to the
obscurity of distinct trade and control lives within them. Expropriation
may have served as a viable solution to this obscurity for certain
frustrated
countries. Thus, the self-determination of individual countries
should not
be frustrated and this sovereign right could be supported by
a supranational
governing body. This supranational authority would be
knowledgeable of the
national plans of individual countries. These plans
would then serve as
guidepoints for multinational corporations operating
within a planned
economy according to the humanistic plan of a
country.
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For example, the national plan would consider issues of employment,
defense, environmental quality, fiscal and monetary policy, regional de-
velopment, mass transportation, national resource development and allo-
18
cation, cultural development, among many others. These plans would then be
supported and facilitated by the supranational organizations so as to regard
national sovereignty with the highest priority and not as an obsolete state
as a result of the economic power of multinational corporations.
Until such time as this agency is organized, the Agreement serves as an
effective device to integrate national priorities with economic criteria.
The Agreement previously served as this mechanism as exemplified by the
commitments made by the Big Four automotive companies to the Government of
Canada in the ’’Letters of Undertaking.”
19
Canada’s problems . In an article by Robert Fulford, the Editor and Vice
President of the Toronto magazine, Saturday Night , he observed the need for
specialization in the Canadian economy, an economy with one of the lowest
levels of investment in research and development among the OECD countries.
Only 33% of the total spent on research and development is financed
by
industry. This figure runs as high as 65% in Japan. Part of the problem
is
that nearly sixty percent of the Canadian manufacturing sector is
owned by
foreign based multinational corporations
.
The critical question posed by Robert Collison, Assistant
Editor of
Saturday Night
,
is if these multinational corporations in 1978
have the
inclination or interest to make the investment and transfer
the technology to
restructure their businesses for Canada’s economic
benefits. It follows that
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any talk about nationalization and technological sovereignty raises the
20problem of continentalism.*
In a recent study by the Alberta economist, Bruce Wilkinson, he observed
that more than 60% of Canadian trade is with the United States and that 60% of
that trade is in crude and semi-processed materials. He further states that
Canada is like a developing nation in that about 50% of our total mineral
exports are in crude rather than semi-processed forms. Canada is running a
deficit for over $10 million in manufactured goods comprised of the
substantial $1 billion in automotive trade with the U.S. for 1977.
Collison feels that Canada can't outperform Korea unless the country is
willing to become a low-wage, labor intensive society. To become a high
technology economy requires massive investment in research and development
and the aggressive promotion of Canadian industry, along with government
planning. Dr. Donald Daly, an economist at York University, further
elaborates: "Much more emphasis should be placed on diffusion of technology
and on areas of research and development where the costs could be spread
over
large markets in which Canada is a potential exporter, rather than
being
spread widely over a variety of domestic manufacturing industries
where
I
22
Canada currently is experiencing serious cost disadvantages."
*Continentalism is defined by Robert Collison as the word
used to define the
impact of the American economic, political and
cultural influence over
Canadian national life.
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Northern Telecom, the manufacturing subsidiary of Canada Bell, has been
quite successful in developing new communications technologies and capturing
lucrative export markets. Robert Scrivener, chairman of Northern Telecom,
says the company realized in the late 1960 's that the Canadian market alone
wouldn't be sufficient to support rising research and development costs. As
a result of this insight. Northern Telecom, aggressively acquired firms in
the U.S. with experienced sales and service force and an expended product
line. The irony of the success of this company, is that Western Electric was
forced to divest itself of its Canadian branch plant then Northern Electric
now Northern Telecom. The Science Council of Canada believes that the
company picked up the challenge of developing its own technological base when
23
the flow of technology from the U.S. based company was curtailed.
The Agreement and the automotive industry . The previous section on the
structure of Canada's manufacturing sector further reflects the necessity
for some degree of national planning. The inconsistency between the increase
in education and low levels of research and development reflects the
inability of the market to uncover a national comparative advantage.
Imperfections in the marketplace also appear as a result of decisions made in
multinational headquarters. John Kenneth Galbrath notes the power
of
multinational corporations in his statement that the "only reasonable
defense of the multinational corporation is now the truth. That
it has power
must be conceded. . .prices are set. Customers are
persuaded. Cultural
patterns are altered. Governments are persuaded. . .The
only durable defense
is to hold that such exercise of power is inevitable
and, if subject to
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2Aproper guidance and restraint, socially useful." The coordination of
government planning and strategic corporate planning, would minimize the
inefficiencies that now exist in the labor and manufacturing sector of the
Canadian economy. The importance of these sectors is pivotal to the
development and maturation of industrialized economies.
The Canadian automotive industry is characterized by an oligopolistic
market with three major automobile manufacturers, the General Motors
Corporation, the Ford Motor Company and the Chrysler Corporation. The
American Motors Corporation is one of the Big Four however with only a 3.8%
share of passenger car sales in Canada in 1975. The three major corporations
possessed 40.4%, 21.9% and 20.1% shares of the total Canadian passenger car
market respectively. Imports attained the remainder 13.8% share including
foreign owned companies operating in Canada excluding the U.S. owned
companies mentioned above.
The control of the Canadian automobile market by American multina-
tionals indicates precisely the difficulty Canada has in developing the
technological comparative advantage that it so desperately needs. The
Agreement makes no specification of the type of investment that
should be
made in meeting the 60% Canadian value added by the U.S. auto
manufacturers.
This requirement has in the past met with increased assembly
operations which
as previously indicated is labor intensive and the
necessary skill level is
low.
On August 15, 1978 the Ford Motor Company made
the decision to invest
$533 million in Windsor, Ontario. Roy Bennet,
President of Ford of Canada
indicated that "the decision to build this
major facility in Canada is
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direct result of close co-operation between industry and government with
25
respect to achieving national objectives including increased employment."
This decision may indicate the precedent of mutual goal setting in the
planning processes of the Canadian government and the U.S. multinationals
operating in Canada. The expected benefits to the Canadian economy, as a
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result of the $533 million Ford investment are;
1. Employment at plant of 2,600.
2. $50 million a year in new personal income and $20.8 million in
retail sales at current wage rates.
3. Increase in feeder industries employment of 1,200 to 1,400.
4. Increase in spinoff for commercial and service industries of
2,600.
5. 80% of the production will be exported.
The investment decision was also contingent on a $68 million incentive
offered by the Canadian government to Ford Motor Company which was supposed
cost differential between building the plant in Lima, Ohio and Windsor,
Ontario. This incentive was denounced by C. Fred Bergsten, the Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs in the Treasury Department, as
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"interventionist practices" by the Government of Canada and Ontario. The
necessity of such incentives was given by the Canadian Ford President, Roy
Bennet, "...to attract any new industry whether it be an automobile
assembly
plant or a shoe manufacturing plant, we in Canada must make
ourselves
competitive with many of the U.S. states which are seeking to
attract new
industry by offering a wide range of incentives.
The need for investment incentives indicates the
imbalance that exists
in costs between the Canadian and United States
automotive industry. This
imbalance is contrary to the supposed outcome
of rationalization of
automotive production which would indicate cost
balance transcending the
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borders. Costs of production are however confounded by government fiscal and
monetary policies which in Canada's case may run contrary to cost efficiency
in the automotive industry. Also indicated may be the inadequacy of the
Agreement in resolving the imbalance in its present form.
The future effectiveness of the Agreement and the competitiveness of the
U.S. -Canadian automotive industry in domestic and export markets is
contingent upon the integration of policy setting of the U.S. multinationals
and the governments of both the U.S. and Canada. This integration of policy
setting in Canada would address the underlying problems in the economy of a
deteriorating competitive position in manufacturing or world markets.
The humanistic paradigm necessitates individual and group insights in
the rule making process or stated in another way, in the policy setting,
procedure and implementation of all sectors. The first step, the government
plan, would be composed of the insights and demands of individuals as
taxpayers, consumers, laborers, and shareholders. This plan would
address
the short and long range problems of the Canadian economy, i.e.
the need for
increased spending in research and development by industry
and objectives
would be cited for use in negotiations with company
officials of the U.S.
automotive companies. The Auto Agreement should be
updated to reflect the
priorities of both governments and the strategic
objectives fo the Big Four
auto companies who own 97% of automotive manufacturing
industry in Canada.
The future of free trade between the U.S.
and Canada. The overall
tiveness of the "freer trade" Automotive
Agreement of 1965 serves as an
excellent reference for free trade agreements
in other sectors of the auto
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industry and other industries. With free trade, specialization and economies
of scale would raise Canadian real income;
1) by a reduction in prices of manufactured goods in Canada to
the U.S. level; and
2) by an increase in nominal wages in manufacturing to the U.S.
level
.
Both the results in fact occured in the automotive industry; prices increased
relatively less than other manufacturing sectors on the wholesale level and
wage parity was achieved.
Free trade on a bilateral basis between the U.S. and Canada does however
undermine the theme of multilaterialism and most favorite nation treatment of
on
the 1948 GATT. Mr. Rolfe Nordlie, of the Transportation Equipment Division
of the U.S. Department of Commerce, also speculates that future free trade
agreements should be on a multilateral basis in line with the GATT
objectives. He feels bilateral agreements give rise to sectionalism and
constant evaluations of relative shares and benefits. In a situation of
inequity of the degree and size of industrialization of the trading partners,
there is constant fear of the smaller power being absorbed by
the more
powerful. He does however empathize with Canada's concerns.
Dr. Donald Daly^^ believes that future free trade between
the U.S. and
Canada should involve the "intermediaries" (i.e.
steel, rubber, tin,
plastic, etc.) in order to share the benefits of free trade
with the entire
automotive sector.
Conclusion . The benefits and shortcomings of free
trade bet«een the b.S. and
Canada hopefully have been clarified in this
study. The author believes in a
general policy of trade liberalization exposing
the gains to national income
133
and economic growth achieved through the more efficient use of a nation's
labor, capital, land, management and other resources. However, national
planning must be coincidental to the liberalization so as to ensure the
competitiveness of the economy on world markets. Multilateralism is pre-
ferred to bilateralism in trade agreements, however implementation and
evaluation of bilateral free trade agreements is crucial to the stages of
economic integration.
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APPENDIX A
TEXT OF UNITED STATES-CANADIAN AGREEMENT
Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada
,
Determined to strengthen the economic relations between their two
countries
;
Recognizing that this can best be achieved through the stimulation of
economic growth and through the expansion of markets available to producers
in both countries within the framework of the established policy of both
countries of promoting multilateral trade;
Recognizing that an expansion of trade can best be achieved through the
reduction or elimination of tariff and all other barriers to trade operating
to impede or distort the full and efficient development of each country's
trade and industrial potential;
Recognizing the important place that the automotive industry occupies
in the industrial economy of the two countries and the interests of industry,
labor and consumers in sustaining high levels of efficient production and
continued growth in the automotive industry;
Agree as follows:
Article I
The Governments of the United States and Canada, pursuant to the above
principles, shall seek the early achievement of the following objectives:
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale production can be
achieved;
(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive
trade
in respect of tariff barriers and other factors tending to
impede on a fair
and equitable basis in the expanding total market of the two
countries;
Cc) The development of conditions in which market forces
may operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment,
production and
trade
.
It shall be the policy of each Government to avoid
actions which would
frustrate the achievement of these objectives.
Article II
U5
(a) The Government of Canada, not later than the entry into force of
the legislation contemplated in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall accord
duty-free treatment to imports of the products of the United Stated described
in Annex A.
(b) The Government of the United States, during the session of the
United Stages Congress commencing on January 4, 1965, shall seek enactment of
legislation authorizing duty-free treatment of imports on the products of
Canada described in Annex B. In seeking such legislation, the Government of
the United States shall also seek authority permitting the implementation of
such duty-free treatment retroactively to the earliest date administratively
possible following the date upon which the Government of Canada has accorded
duty-free treatment. Promptly after the entry into force of such
legislation, the Government of the United States shall accord duty-free
treatment to the products of Canada described in Annex B.
Article III
The commitments made by the two Governments in this Agreement shall not
preclude action by either Government consistent with its obligations under
Part II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Article IV
(a) At any time, at the request of either Government, the two Gov-
ernments shall consult with respect to any matter relating to this Agreement.
(b) Without limiting the foregoing, the two Governments shall, at the
request of either Government, consult with respect to any problems which may
arise concerning automotive producers in the United States which do not at
present have facilities in Canada for the manufacture of motor vehicles, and
with respect to the implications for the operation of this Agreement of new
automotive producers becoming established in Canada.
(c) No later than January 1, 1968, the two Governments shall jointly
undertake a comprehensive review of the progress made towards achieving
the
objectives set forth in Article I. During this review the Governments shall
consider such further steps as may be necessary or desirable for the
full
achievement of these objectives.
Article V
Access to the United States and Canadian markets provided
for under this
Agreement may by agreement be accorded on similar terms to
ot er coun ries.
Article VI
This Agreement shall enter into force provisionally on the date of
signature and definitively on the date upon which notes are exchanged between
the two Governments giving notice that appropriate action in their respective
legislatures has been completed.
Article VII
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. Each Government shall
however have the right to terminate this Agreement twelve months from the
date on which that Government gives written notice to the other Government of
its intention to terminate the Agreement.
In witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments have
signed this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Johnson City, Texas, this 16th day of January 1965,
in English and French, the two texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of the United States of America:
(S) Lyndon B. Johnson
(S) Dean Rusk
For the Government of Canada:
(S) Lester B. Pearson
(S) Paul Martin
Annex A
(1) Automobiles, when imported by a manufacturer of
automobiles.
(2) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof,
except tires and
tubes, when imported for use as original equipment in automobiles
to be
produced in Canada by a manufacturer of automobiles.
(3) Buses, when imported by a manufacturer of buses.
(4) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof,
except tires an
tubes, when imported for use as original equipment
in buses to be
produced in Canada by a manufacturer of buses.
.
. ^
(5) Specified commercial vehicles, when
imported by
facturer of specified commercial vehicles.
(6) All parts, and accessories and parts
thereof, excep i ,
tubes 'and any Lchines or other articles
item 438a to be valued separately under the
tariff items regula y
1A7
applicable thereto, when imported for use as original equipment in
specified commercial vehicles to be produced in Canada by a manufacturer
of specified commercial vehicles.
2. (1) "Automobile" means a four-wheeled passenger automobile having
a seating capacity for not more than ten persons;
(2) "Base year" means the period of twelve months commencing on
the 1st day of August, 1963 and ending on the 31st day of July, 196A;
(3) "Bus" means a passenger motor vehicle having a seating
capacity for more than 10 persons, or a chassis therefor, but does not
include any following vehicle or chassis therefor, namely an electric
trackless trolley bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or half-tracked
vehicle or motor vehicle designed primarily for off-highway use;
(4) "Canadian value added" has the meaning assigned by regulations
made under section 273 of the Canadian Customs Act;
(5) "Manufacturer" of vehicles of any following class, namely
automobiles, buses or specified commercial vehicles, means, in relation
to any importation of goods in respect of which the description is
relevant, a manufacturer that
(i) produced vehicles of that class in Canada in each of the four
consecutive three months' periods in the base year, and
(ii) produced vehicles of that class in Canada in the period of
twelve months ending on the 31st day of July in which the
importation is made.
(A) the ratio of the net sales value of which to the net
sales value of all vehicles of that class sold for consumption
in Canada by the manufacturer in that period is equal to or
higher than the ratio of the net sales value of all vehicles
of that class produced in Canada by the manufacturer in the
base year to the net sales value of all vehicles of that class
sold for consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in the base
year, and is not in any case lower than seventy-five to one
hundred; and
(B) the Canadian value added of which is equal to or
greater than the Canadian value added of all vehicles of that
class produced in Canada by the manufacturer in the base year;
(6) "Net sales value" has the meaning assigned by
regulations made
under section 273 of the Canadian Customs Act; and
(7) "Specified commercial vehicle" means a motor
truck, motor
truck chassis, ambulance or chassis therefor, or hearse or
chassis
therefor, but does not include: .
(a) any following vehicle or a chassis designed
primarily
therefor, namely a bus, electric trackless trolley bus,
amphibious
vehicle tracked or half-tracked vehicle, golf or
invalid cart,
straddle carrier, motor vehicle designed primarily for
off-hig way use,
or motor vehicle specially constructed equipped
to perform special
services or functions, such as, but not limited to,
a fire engi ,
mobile crane, wrecker, concrete mixer or mobile
clinic; or
1A8
(b) any machine or other article required under Canadian tariff
item 438a to be valued separately under the tariff item regularly
applicable thereto.
3. The Government of Canada may designate a manufacturer not falling
within the categories set out above as being entitled to the benefit of
duty-free treatemnt in respect of the goods described in this Annex.
Annex B
(1) Motor vehicles for the transport of persons or articles as provided
for in items 692.05 and 692.10 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States
and chassis therefor, but not including electric trolley buses, three-
wheeled vehicles, or trailers accompanying truck tractors, or chassis
therefor.
(2) Fabricated components, not including trailers, tires, or tubes for
tires, for use as original equipment in the manufacture of motor vehicles of
the kinds described in paragraph (1) above.
(3) Articles of the kinds described in paragraphs (1) and (2) above
include such articles whether finished or unfinished but do not include any
article produced with the use of materials imported into Canada which are
products of any foreign country (except materials produced within the customs
territory of the United States)
,
if the aggregate value of such imported
materials when landed at the Canadian port of entry, exclusive of any landing
cost and Canadian duty, was -
(a) with regard to articles of the kinds described in paragraph (1)
,
not including chassis, more than 60 per cent until January 1, 1968, and
thereafter more than 50 per cent of the appraised customs value of the
article imported into the customs territory of the United States; and
(b) with regard to chassis of the kinds described in paragraph (1)
,
and articles of the kinds described in paragraph (2), more than 50 per
cent of the appraised customs value of the article imported into the
customs territory of the United States,
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LETTERS OF UNDERTAKING
General Motors of Canada, Ltd.,
Hon. C. M. Drury, Oshawa, Ontario, January 13, 1965.
Minister of Industry,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Ontario.
Dear Mr. Minister: This letter is in response to your request for a
statement with respect to the proposed agreement between the Governments of
Canada and the United States concerning trade and production in automotive
products, as you have described it to us. The following comments assume that
the proposed agreement for duty-free treatment has the full support of the
respective Governments, and that the program may be expected to continue for
a considerable period of time.
It is our understanding that the important objectives of the inter-
governmental agreement are as follows: (a) the creation of a broader market
for automotive products within which the full benefits of specialization and
large-scale production can be achieved; (b) the liberalization of United
States and Canadian automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and other
factors tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the industries of both
countries to participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total
market of the two countries; (c) the development of conditions in which
market forces may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of
investment, productions, and trade. We subscribe to these objectives and
agree with the suggested approach of removing tariff barriers and moving in
the direction of free trade even in this limited area. Such an approach is
fully compatible with General Motors' expressed position with respect to the
desirability of free trade in automotive vehicles and components, not only in
Canada, but in all other countries in the free world.
It is noted that under the proposed agreement the right to import
vehicles and certain automotive parts, free of duty, into Canada will be
available to Canadian vehicle manufacturers who (p maintain Canadian value
added in the production of motor vehicles in ensuing model years ^t not less
than the Canadian value added in motor vehicle production in the 1964
model
year; (2) produce motor vehicles in Canada having a net factory
sales value
in a ratio to total net factory sales value of their motor
vehicle spes in
Canada and those of their affiliated companies in Canada of not
less than the
ratio prevailing during the 1964 model year; (3) increase in
each ensuing
model year over the base year, Canadian value added in the
production of
vehicles and original equipment parts by an amount equal to 60
per cent ot
the growth in their market for automobiles sold for consumption
in Canada and
by afamount equal to 50 per cent of the growht in their market
for commerical
vehicles sold for comsumption in Canada (for this purpose,
in their
market means the difference between the cost °*''f^''l“"°^Canadfduring
during the ensuing model year and the cost of ( 4 )
®
the base model year net of Federal sales tax in
both cases), ana
undertake, in addition to meeting the above three
stipulated increase in the annual Canadian value
added by the end
model year 1968.
150
With respect to General Motors, in connection with the conditions
outlined in the previous paragraph, it is our understanding, in the case of
(1) that Canadian value added would be decreased in circumstances where the
value of General Motors sales declined below that achieved in the base year,
and in the case of (3) that in the event of a decline in General Motors net
value of vehicle sales for consumption in Canada, a decrease in Canadian
value added of 60 and 50 per cent in cars and trucks, respectively, is
acceptable. In addition, it is our understanding, with respect to ( 4 ), that
for General Motors the stipulated annual increase in the Canadian value added
by the end of the model year 1968 is $121 million.
We understand that certain changes are proposed in the regulations
pertaining to the determination of Canadian value added. We believe that
several of these changes require further review and consideration as in our
opinion they tend to impede rather than aid in the attainment of the
objectives of the agreement.
In particular, these are (a) the elimination of the profit on components
purchased from affiliated Canadian companies; (b) the elimination of profit
on sales of vehicles and parts by General Motors of Canada or by Canadian
affiliated companies to affiliated companies outside of Canada; and (c) the
elimination of depreciation on non-Canadian facilities used in the
manufacturing process both in our plants and in those of our Canadian
suppliers
.
(a) We believe that the elimination of the profit element on purchases
of components purchased by General Motors of Canada from affiliated Canadian
companies is discriminatory. McKinnon Industires, a major supplier of
components, has been an affiliate of ours since 1929. McKinnon prices to us
are competitive with those for similar components manufactured by other
manufacturers . It is a policy of General Motors that pricing between
affiliated operations be competitive and the purchasing unit has the
obligation of negotiating the best possible price with the supplying unit.
McKinnon and other affiliated Canadian parts manufacturers supply parts to
other Canadian vehicle manufacturers and the profit on these transactions is
not required to be eliminated by those manufacturers. We feel that at most
any elimination of profit from value added should be confined to the
elimination of profit above the percentage level in the base period.
(b) It is our opinion that the elimination of the profit on sales of
vehicles and parts produced in Canada by General Motors of Canada and
affiliated Canadian companies to affiliated General Motors companies in
the
United States and other countries is also discriminatory and should be
given
added consideration. It is recognized in the tariff regulations
of most
countries that the value of imported goods includes a reasonable
rate of
profit. Further, on sales by nonaffiliated Canadian suppliers
to General
Motors Corp. in the United States and its overseas subsidiaries
the profit in
such sales would be considered as Canadian value added.
(cl On the matter of exclusion of depreciation on
non-Canadian
.chinery and equipment used in the production of automot^
„Ctt'ives'oma
Canada, it seems that this only hinders the attainment
of the ohje^
the plan. In order to increase production in Canada,
additional p y
a necessity either in our plants or those of our ^“f-lters
As much of this
required equipment is either unavailable or more costly
in Canada, app
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that no allowing depreciation on such equipment as Canadian value added
discourages rather than encourages the enthusiasm required to effect the
desired increase in Canadian value added. It should be noted, however, that
it is our intention to maintain our present policy of obtaining any
additional machinery and equipment in Canada whenever economically feasible.
You have requested that we should increase Canadian value added in our
products by $141 million between 1964 and the end of the model year 1968, as
outlined under condition (4) . Also you have requested that the amount should
be further increased to the extent required under condition (3) stated above.
We think that this objective in that time is extremely ambitious,
particularly in view of the fact that one-half of the first model year has
already passed.
We have carefully reviewed our situation in the light of your proposals
and requests and have asked that our affiliates do the same. We can see areas
where we can and will achieve a significant portion of your suggested
objective of $121 million increase in Canadian value added in 1968. This is
possible because General Motors of Canada and our affiliated Canadian
companies have recently engaged in the Canadian manufacture of certain
automotive components heretofore imported. These include the fabrication
and assembly of automatic transmissions at McKinnon Industries Windsor plant
not only for Canadian requirements but for export to assembly plants in other
countries as well. In addition, in the 1964 model year the oversea market
for North American-type passenger cars and commercial vehicles has been
icnreasingly served by our plants in Canada. Of course, any slowing down in
the rate of growth in the industry or any adverse developments in the
economies of Canada, the United States, or other principal markets, or
failure to achieve duty-free entry into the United States would make this
achievement more difficult. r 4.u i
To attain your stated objective ratably over the 4 years of the plan
amounts to an increase in Canadian value added of $30 million a year plus
growth. Our plans, which have been underway for more than a year,
should
accomplish about $60 million of the total or. Pitting it another way, we
can
see our way clear to accomplish that portion applicable to the
first y
^^StudTes are underway of various steps we might take to
accomplish that
portion applicable to the last 2 years. However we are
operating our facilities in Canada at full capacity, and
so, I Relieve have
mos^of our suppliers. Therefore, the Canadian value added
applicable to the
last 2 years wUl probably require added facilities on
part of our suppliers, or both. A further
reappraisal of our Present
facilities and our capacity and those of our suppliers
must be made. Th
fxteifand Mature of a^ny ad’^itional facilities can be
determined only in the
ifghfof th^X as flLlly published. You can appreciate, I am sure, that
"sulw^to^the^Lponderables mentioned above, it is our intention
and
you will review your position further
in the light ot tne
included earlier in this letter.
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In conclusion, therefore, I am prepared to say at this time that, first.
General Motors of Canada has plans underway to increase Canadian value added
by about $30 million in each of the first 2 years of the plan; and, second, we
are continuing our studies of ways to accomplish the remainder of the program
and will undertake to meet the full objective of $121 million by the end of
the model year 1968.
It is anticipated that these studies will take between 3 and 4 months to
finish, and I will be prepared to discuss the results with you when they are
completed. From time to time, as requested, we will be glad to discuss our
current operations and our plans for future development with the Minister if
Industry, and to receive and consider his suggestions.
Sincerely,
E. H. Walker.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.,
Oakville, Ontario, January 14, 1965.
Dear Mr. Minister: Enclosed are executed copies of our two letters to
you of this date relative to the proposed agreement between the Governments
of Canada and the United States concerning trade and production in automotive
products under which it is proposed that the customs duty in each country on
the importation from the other of automotive vehicles and original equipment
parts therefore be eliminated.
We consider it essential that any substantial administrative inter-
pretation or treatment that may be extended by you to any other motor vehicle
manufacturer, the lack of which would place Ford Motor Co. in a
noncompetitive position, also be extended to Ford.
You have provided us with a draft of the proposed order in council
expected to be adopted in order to implement that agreement and with a draft
of the regulations proposed to be adopted under that order in council.
Our undertakings are, of course, conditional upon the execution of that
agreement, upon the adoption of an order in council, and regulations
substantially in the form of the drafts that you have already delivered to
us, and upon an acceptable response in respect of the enclosed supplementary
letter.
Yours sincerely.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.,
By Karl E. Scott, President.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd. ,
Oakville, Ontario, January 14, 1965.
Dear Mr. Minister: We are writing with respect to the
agreement between
the Governments of Canada and the United States
concerning production and
trade in automotive products.
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Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., welcomes the agreement and supports its
objectives. In this regard, our company notes that the Governments of Canada
and the United States have agreed ”*** that any expansion of trade can best
be achieved through the reduction or elimination of tariff and all other
barriers to trade operating to impede or distort the full and efficient
development of each country's trade and industrial potential***." In
addition, we note that the Governments of Canada and the United States shall
seek the early achievement of the following objectives:
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive products within
which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale production can be
achieved;
(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive trade
in respect of tariff barriers and other factors tending to impede it, with a
view to enabling the industries of both countries to participate on a fair
and equitable basis in the expanding total market of the two countries; and
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces may operate
effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investment, production,
and trade.
Our company also notes that the right to import motor vehicles and
original equipment parts into Canada under the agreement is available to
vehicle manufacturers in Canada who meet the conditions stipulated in the
Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1965. These conditions are, in brief, that
vehicle manufacturers shall maintain in each model year their production of
motor vehicles in Canada in the same ratio to sales of motor vehicles for
consumption in Canada and the same dollar value of Canadian value added in
the production of motor vehicles in Canada, as in the period August 1, 1963
to July 31, 1964.
We understand that --
(i) in ascertaining whether Ford qualifies as a motor vehicle
manufacturer and whether the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2, below,
are satisfied, production of automotive vehicles in Canada by Ford Motor
Co. of Canada, Ltd., and by any person designated as associated with
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd. ("an associated person") will be taken
into account, whether sold in Canada or exported;
, ^ jo
(ii) in determining whether the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2,
below, are satisfied, export sales of original equipment parts by
Ford
Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., and by any associated person in Canada
(as
well as production of automotive vehicles in Canada by Ford Motor
Co. o
Canada, Ltd., and by any associated person, whether sold in
Canada or
exported), and purchases of original equipment parts by any
affiliated
Ford company outside of Canada from Canadian vendors, will
be taken into
account. An "affiliated Ford company" is one that
controls, or is
controlled by, or is under common control with. Ford
Motor Co.
Canada ^_Ltd
.for purpose of computing the ratios referred
b®
paragUh 2(1) (e) (ii) (A) of the order in council
Lnufacturer, the numerators of the fractions ^
sales value of all pasenger automobiles (or
specified commerci
vehicles or buses) produced by the motor vehicle
manufacturer in Canad ,
I^ciuding those ioW in Canada and those sold in export,
and the
15A
denominators of the fractions will consist of the net sales value of all
passenger automobiles (or of specified commercial vehicles or buses)
sold by the motor vehicle manufacturer for consumption in Canada,
including imported passenger cars (or specified commercial vehicles or
buses) but excluding passenger cars (or specified commercial vehicles
or buses) that are produced by the motor vehicle manufacturer in Canada
and sold in export.
The undertakings in this letter are based on the definition of "Canadian
value added" in your present regulations.
We understand that in the computation of Canadian value added for
vehicle assembly in Canada, section 2(a) (i) of the regulations would prevent
us from including the cost of parts produced in Canada that are exported from
Canada and subsequently imported into Canada as components of original
equipment parts; this provision reduced the incentive to source in Canada
parts that would be incorporated in U.S. engines and other original equipment
parts. Accordingly, we request that you give careful consideration to the
revision of this clause.
In addition to meeting these stipulated conditions and in order to
contribute to meeting the objectives of the agreement. Ford Motor Co. of
Canada, Ltd., undertakes:
1. To increase in each model year over the preceding model year
Canadian value added in the production of vehicles and original
equipment parts by an amount equal to 60 per cent of the growth in the
market for automobiles sold by our company for consumption in Canada and
by an amount equal to 50 per cent of the growth in the market for the
commercial vehicles specified in tariff item 950 sold by our company for
consumption in Canada, it being understood that in the event of a
decline in the market a decrease in Canadian value added based on the
above percentages is acceptable. For this purpose, growth or decline in
the market shall be measured as the difference between the cost to our
company of vehicles sold in Canada during the current model year and the
cost to our company of vehicles sold in Canada during the preceding
model year net of Federal sales taxes in both cases.
We understand that in the event that the total passenger car
and/or
total truck sales of our company in any model year fall below
the total
passenger car and/or total truck sales of our company during the
base
period, Canadian value added requirements would be reduced
below the
base period amounts for the purpose of this section,
and for the
conditions stipulated in the Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1965.
We believe that the definition of growth is unfair
because it
includes as growth the difference between the cost of
vehicles Produced
in Canada and the cost to us of identical imported
vehicles. In the
event that we rationalize our vehicle production
in Canada to
concentrate our production in Canada on high
American market with other models being imported,
the diff
4-u^v.p
t^ SefiLd above would result in a substantial S-"'*
was no change in the number and models of
vehicles sold in Canada, we
request you? careful consideration of a change
in the defrnition that
w??H eliminate this inequity. This inequity is
compounded by the fact
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that Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., is compelled by the Canadian
antidumping law to import vehicles at dealer price, and we request that
your Government also give careful consideration to a change in the
antidumping law in respect of vehicles imported under the Motor Vehicles
Tariff Order 1965.
2. To increase Canadian value added over and above the amount that we
achieved in the period August 1, 1963, to July 31, 1964, and that which
we undertake to achieve in (1) above, by an amount of $74.2 million
during the period August 1, 1967, to July 31, 1968.
The undertakings given in this letter are to be adjusted to the extent
necessary for conditions not under the control of the Ford Motor Co. of
Canada, Ltd., or of any affiliated Ford company, such as acts of God, fire,
earthquake, strikes at any plant owned by Ford or by any of our suppliers,
and war.
The Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., also agrees to report to the
Minister of Industry, every 3 months beginning April 1, 1965, such in-
formation as the Minister of Industry requires pertaining to progress
achieved by our company, as well as plans to fulfill our obligations under
this letter. In addition. Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., understands that
the Government will conduct an audit each year with respect to the matters
described in this letter.
We understand that before the end of model year 1968 we will need to
discuss together the prospects for the Canadian automotive industry and our
company's program.
Yours sincerely.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.
By K. E. Scott, President
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.,
Oakville, Ontario, January 14, 1965.
Dear Mr. Minister: I wish to bring to your attention a matter of
major
importance to the Ford Motor Co., which will affect the ability
of the
company to participate under the Motor Vehicle Tariff Order 1965.
You will recall that our company and its parent. Ford Motor
Co., ha
made commitments to spend in excess of $50 million to increase P^^duc^"^
?f
a limited range of automotive engines in Canada for
use in our Canadian
plants and for export to the United States. This plan
provides for greatly
expanded production of engines in Canada, thus making
cost savings . The production of certain engines now
produced in short high
colt runs will be di^scontinned in Canada hut will be
As a result of this plan, the contribution of
engines to
be increased substantially over our actual
value addea oi engi f
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in the 1964 model year. For the purpose of the definition of a motor vehicle
manufacturer, however, our value added in Canada in the production of motor
vehicles in Canada in the base year may experience a short fall of
approximately $22 million. Regardless of this possibility, our total
Canadian value added will be maintained at the level of our basic undertaking
set forth in paragraph 2 of our letter of January 14, 1965.
Should the total Canadian value added in Ford's vehicle assembly in
Canada in any model year fall below the level prevailing in model year 1964,
Ford undertakes to purchase an additional amount over the amount purchased in
the base year of automotive components from Canadian vendors who are not
affiliated with a vehicle manufacturer, which is equal to the short fall in
Canadian value added below the level achieved in model year 1964.
This undertaking is conditional upon the Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.,
being accorded the same tariff treatment it would receive as if it qualified
under the Motor Vehicle Tariff Order 1965.
Yours sincerely.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd.,
By Karl E. Scott, President
Chrysler Canada, Ltd.,
January 13, 1965.
Hon. C. M. Drury,
Minister of Industry,
Ottawa, Canada.
Dear Mr. Minister: I am writing with respect to the agreement between
the Governments of Canada and the United States concerning
production and
trade in automotive products. 4. • 4.
Chrysler Canada, Ltd., welcomes the agreement and supports
its ob-
jectives. In this regard, our company notes that the Governments of Canada
and the United States have agreed "***that any expansion of
trade can best be
achieved through the reduction or elimination of tariff
and all other
barriers to trade operating to impede or distort the £“11
development of each country's trade and industrial
potentia
_
addition, we note that the Governments of Canada and
the United States shall
seek the early achievement of the following objectives.
(a) The creation of a broader market for
automotive products
within which the full benefits of specialization
and large-seal
production can
of United States and Canadian
trade^ii rls;ect of tariff barriers and other £“f
it with a view to enabling the industries of both
countries to
Jakiciate o"a fair and equitable basis in the
expanding total market
"‘’"fcTS'he^detaoplent of conditions in which
market forces may
opera^e^fLltiveTyr attain the most economic pattern of investment,
production, and trade.
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Our company also notes that the right to import motor vehicles and
original equipment parts into Canada under the agreement is available to
vehicle manufacturers in Canada who meet the conditions stipulated in the
Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1965.
These conditions are, in brief, that vehicle manufacturers shall
maintain in each model year their domestic production of motor vehicles in
the same ratio to their domestic sales of motor vehicles and the same dollar
value of Canadian value added in the production of motor vehicles in Canada,
as in the period August 1, 1963, to July 31, 1964.
In addition to meeting these stipulated conditions and in order to
contribute to meeting the objectives of the agreement, Chrysler Canada, Ltd.,
undertakes —
1. To increase in each model year over the preceding model year, the
dollar value of Canadian value added in the production of vehicles and
original equipment parts by an amount equal to 60 per cent of the growth
in the market for automobiles sold by our company for consumption in
Canada and by an amount equal to 50 per cent of the growth in the market
for the commercial vehicles specified in tariff item 950 sold by our
company for consumption in Canada, it being understood that in the event
of a decline in the market a decrease in such dollar value of Canadian
value added in the above percentages is acceptable. For this purpose,
growth or decline in the market shall be measured as the difference
between the cost to our company of vehicles sold in Canada during the
current model year and the cost to our company of vehicles sold in
Canada during the preceding model year net of Federal sales taxes in
both cases, and
.j j • 4.u
2. to increase the dollar value of Canadian value added in the
production of vehicles and original equipment parts over and above the
amount that we achieved in the period August 1, 1963, to July 31, >
and that which we undertake to achieve in (1) above, by an amount of $33
million during the period August 1, 1967, to July 31, 1968.
Chrysler Canada, Ltd., also agrees to report to the Minister
dustry, every 3 months beginning April 1, 1965, such information
as the
Minister of Industry requires pertaining to progress achieved by
our company,
as well as plans to fulfill our obligations under this letter.
Chrysler Canada, Ltd., understands that the Government will
conduct an audit
each year with respect to the matters described in this letter.
I understand that before the end of model year
1968 we will need to
discuss together the prospects for the Canadian automotive
industry and our
company's program.
Yours sincerely.
Pro Forma Letter Respecting Company Commitments
January 14, 1965.
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Hon. C. M. Drury,
Minister of Industry,
Parliament Building,
Ottawa, Canada.
Dear Mr. Minister: I am writing with respect to the agreement between
the Governments of Canada and the United States concerning production and
trade in automotive products.
The American Motors (Canada), Ltd., welcomes the agreement and supports
its objectives. In this regard, our company notes that the Governments of
Canada and the United States have agreed "*** that any expansion of trade can
best be achieved through the reduction or elimination of tariff and all other
barriers to trade operating to impede or distort the full and efficient
development of each country's trade and industrial potential ***" . In
addition, we note that the Governments of Canada and the United States shall
seek the early achievement of the following objectives:
(a) The creation of a broader market for automotive products
within which the full benefits of specialization and large-scale
production can be achieved;
(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian automotive
trade in respect to tariff barriers and other factors tending to impede
it, with a view to enabling the industries of both countries to
participate on a fair and equitable basis in the expanding total market
of the two countries: and
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces may
operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern of investmnt,
production, and trade.
. • n j
Our company also ntoes that the right to import motor vehicles and
original equipment parts into Canada under the agreement is available to
vehicle manufacturers in Canada who meet the conditions stipulated in the
Motor Vehicles Tariff Order 1965. These conditions are, in brief,
that
vehicle manufacturers shall maintain in each model year their domestic
production of motor vehicles in the same ratio to sales of motor vehicles
and
the same dollar value of Canadian value added in ^he production
of motor
vehicles in Canada, as in the period August 1, 1963, to July 31, 1964.
In addition to meeting these stipulated conditions and in
order to
contribute to meeting the objectives of the agreement, the American Motors
(Canada) Ltd., undertakes:
1. To increase in each model year over the preceding
model year,
Canadian value added in the production of vehicles
and
equipment parts by an amount equal to 60 per cent of the
gr
mLket for automobiles specified in tariff item 950 sold by
our compay
for consumption in Canada, it being understood ^
decline in the market a decrease in Canadian value
added in the above
nprcentaees is acceptable. For this purpose, growth
or decline in tne
market shall be measured as the difference
between the cost to our
r-Zo Ir-^p^^t/v^h s^^ni ^f-a^rri^'iJT^c^ding
achieved in the period August 1, 1963, to July 31,
i9b4, ana
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we undertake to achieve in (1) above, by an amount of $11,200,000 during
the period August 1, 1967, to July 31, 1968.
The American Motors (Canada), Ltd., also agrees to report to the
Minister of Industry, every 3 months beginning April 1, 1965, such in-
formation as the Minister of Industry requires pertaining to progress
achieved by our company, as well as to fulfill our obligations under this
letter. In addition, the American Motors (Canada), Ltd., understands that
the Government will conduct an audit each year with respect to the matters
described in this letter.
I understand that before the end of model year 1968 we will need to
discuss together the prospects for the Canadian automotive industry and our
company’s program.
Yours sincerely,
Earl K. Brownridge,
President, American Motors
(Canada), Ltd.
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Summary of Excerpts from Schedule "A” of Canadian
Customs Tariff Pertaining to Tariff Items 438a thru 438f
438a This item establishes the rate on motor vehicles; free under the
British Preferential Tariff, 17 1/2 per cent under the Most-Favoured-
Nation Tariff.
438b This item covers a list of products generally used by the parts industry
in the manufacture of motor vehicle parts. These products are free of
duty if of a class or kind not made in Canada, and they are subject to a
17 1/2 per cent rate of duty under the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff if of
a class or kind made in Canada. In either case, they are free under the
British Preferential Tariff.
438c This item covers a long list of parts generally used by the automobile
manufacturers. For this item, the double condition must be met if entry
is to be duty-free; the part must be of a class or kind not made in
Canada and a content requirement must be met; 40 per cent of the
factory cost of passenger automobiles if production is less than 10,000
units, 50 per cent if the production is more than 10,000 units but does
not exceed 20,000, and 60 per cent if production exceeds 20,000 units.
If these conditions are not met, these parts are subject to the 17 1/2
per cent rate of the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff. Again, parts are free
of duty under the British Preferential Tariff.
438d This item covers a list of parts used in the manufacture of commercial
vehicles. Again the double condition must be met in order to qualify
for duty-free entry under the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff but the
Commonwealth content requirement is 40 per cent, whatever the scale of
production. Parts are duty-free under the British Preferential Tariff.
438f This item covers all the parts not specifically provided for under
the
above items. The rates are free under the British Preferential Tariff
and 25 per cent under the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff.
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL MODELLING IN THE U.S. -CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
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APPENDIX B
Statistical Modelling in the U.S. -Canadian Automotive Industry
Use of statistical modelling for this study was carefully considered and
researched and contact was made with experts on U.S
.
/Canadian trade. A
summary follows;
1. Charles R. Weaver, Director of Transportation Equipment Programs,
U.S. Department of Commerce .
Mr. Weaver was a principal consultant in the preliminary evaluations of
the proposed Automotive Agreement prior to 1965 and presently heads the
division responsible for the continued evaluations and logistics of the
1965 Agreement.
In a conversation on February 27, 1978, Mr. Weaver queried "how
management’s decision to invest large sums of money in auto facilities can be
considered in any statistical model." He further described the Agreement as
being based more on political than economic considerations.
2. Rolfe Nordlie, Assistant Director of Transportation Equipment,
U.S. Department of Commerce.
Mr. Nordlie' s specific assignment is as operations director of the Auto
Agreement.
In an interview on May 24, 1978, Mr. Nordlie stated that there are
too many variables to account for..., and the inputs are not substantially
precise to use in an econometric model." In his capacity, Mr. Nordlie has
access to unlimited statistical and economic capability and resources.
Carl Beigie, President of the National Planning Association,
as a^
private organization comprised of business, government and
academic
leaders working for the Canadian and United States government.
Mr.
Beigie has researched extensively on the Auto Agreement.
In a conversation on February 28,
modelling as being inappropriate as he
political animal."
1978, Mr. Beigie viewed attempts at
sees the Agreement largely as "... a
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4. Dr. Paul Wonnacott, Department of Economics, University of Mary-
land .
Dr. Wonnacott individually and with his brother, Dr. Ronald Wonnacott,
has extensively researched the topic of free trade between the United
States and Canada.
Dr. Wonnacott reviewed the preliminary proposal for this study and his
insights are included in the final proposal. He views modelling as
ineffective in the evaluation of the Agreement for the similar reasons as did
Mr. Beigie. In fact, it was Dr. Wonnacott who referred me to Mr. Beigie at
the National Planning Association.
5. Dr. Donald Daly
,
an economic theorist and statistician currently
Professor of Economics at York University, Toronto, Canada, reviewed
the research proposal and made several suggestions, including further
explanations of tariffs and their effects which he has not seen
researched at all to date. His ideas and suggestions have been included
in the study. He discouraged any attempts to introduce modelling in the
research design.
After having reviewed the literature to date on international trade in
free trade areas, classical and neo“classical theories of international
economics and heard insights from industry and academic experts, I
reluctantly conclude that model building would add little to an understanding
and effective evaluation of the United States and Canadian automobile
industry. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Agreement will be
based
largely on comparisons between the non-free trade manufacturing
industries
and the free trade automobile industry.


